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In this paper, we evaluate four explanations for economic stagnation that have been
proposed in the literature: coordination failures, ineﬀective mix of occupational choices,
insuﬃcient human capital accumulation, and politico-economic considerations. We cali-
brate models that embody these explanations in the context of the stagnant economies
of sub-Saharan Africa. The methodology of calibration is ideally suited for this evalua-
tion, given the paucity of high-quality data, the high degree of model nonlinearity, and
the need for conducting counterfactual policy experiments. In addition to studying how
closely and robustly these models capture the African situation, we examine the quanti-
tative aspects of their policy implications. We ﬁnd that calibrations that yield multiple
equilibria — one prosperity and the other stagnation — are not particularly robust. This
tempers optimism about the eﬃcacy of one-shot or temporary development policies sug-
gested by models with multiplicity. However, the calibrated models indicate that small
policy interventions are suﬃcient to trigger development in stagnant economies.
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and suggestions.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A substantial branch of the literature on economic growth and development is devoted to
understanding stagnation, a condition in which economies are locked into low output and
income. Understanding the causes of stagnation and policies to overcome it has immense
implications for human welfare. Most papers in this tradition develop theoretical models to
highlight a particular economic force, and provide conditions under which stagnation, or a
“trap” as it is often referred to, results. Policy implications are mentioned, but typically not
analyzed or quantiﬁed in detail.
How well do these models explain the economic stagnation seen in the data? What are
the quantitative implications of policies they suggest? Since the reasons for stagnation are
likely to be as multifarious as engines of growth, are there any policy lessons to be learned
by considering these models collectively instead of one at a time? These are a few of the
questions we address in this paper, by applying the methodology of calibration to selected
models. The poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa (sSA), in which per capita income and
output have been low and stagnant during the last three to four decades, provide a natural
context for such an evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst attempt at a
quantitative and comparative evaluation of models of stagnation.1
Calibration is ideally suited for the study of stagnant environments, where the scarcity of
high-quality data makes detailed econometric analysis, especially at the macroeconomic level,
diﬃcult.2 Calibration also readily lends itself to analyzing counterfactual policy experiments
that can pry an economy out of stagnation.
We evaluate four explanations for stagnation found in the literature: 1) Unresolved coor-
dination problems in the presence of increasing returns, 2) Occupational choices detrimental
to development arising from imperfect capital markets, 3) Insuﬃcient human capital accumu-
lation, also driven by capital market imperfections, and 4) Political economy considerations
that lock an economy into a low-performing state.
We choose models that are representative of each explanation for our calibration exercise.
While other explanations and models could be found, the ones chosen do provide enough
diverse dimensions for conducting a comparative quantitative analysis of the problem of
economic stagnation. We distinguish between parameters that are “structural” in the sense
that they are expected to hold everywhere, and those particular to sSA that cause stagnation
1See Azariadis (1996), and Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoﬀ (2003) for state-of-the-art surveys on models of
poverty traps. For detailed evidence on the stagnancy of sub-Saharan Africa see Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2002) and Caucutt and Kumar (2004).
2For examples of econometric work, see Durlauf and Johnson (1995), who ﬁnd multiple regimes in cross-
country dynamics, Quah (1996), who studies distribution dynamics, and McKenzie and Woodruﬀ (2002),
who ﬁnd little evidence for production non-convexities as a source of poverty traps among Mexican microen-
terprises.
1in a given model. For structural parameters we use the more readily available data from
developed countries. For particular parameters, we use data from sSA, from whichever
country and source it is available, and rely on ranges of estimates where needed.
Once we evaluate the robustness of a model in producing the stagnant outcome, we
design and implement policy experiments that are appropriate to the model. We quantify
each policy in terms of tax rates, cost of subsidies as a fraction of GDP, or welfare gain in
terms of equivalent variation so that we can compare policies across models. Mauritius, a
successful economy in sSA, often serves as an empirical anchor against which we assess a
model’s policy recommendations.
To study coordination problems, we calibrate the “Big Push” models of Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1989), which feature expectations-driven multiple equilibria. Each sector in the
economy is willing to incur a ﬁxed cost and implement a labor saving technology if it expects
all other sectors to do so, but not otherwise. We can ﬁnd reasonable parameters for which
this multiplicity results. However, for this and most other models we study, multiplicity is not
particularly robust to changes in parameters in the direction of greater empirical plausibility.
Conditional on multiplicity, a fairly low rate of one-time investment subsidy, 4 to 7% for
most parametrizations, is enough to avoid stagnation. The drive toward industrialization by
Mauritius in the 70s, using investment tax subsidies and other incentives to foster export
processing zones, provides empirical support for this type of policy intervention.
We calibrate the Banerjee and Newman (1993) model to study the role of occupational
choice in stagnation. In this model, imperfect enforcement in the capital market motivates
collateral-based lending for project ﬁnancing. Based on the level of their initial wealth,
agents choose to be workers, self-employed, or entrepreneurs. If the starting ratio of workers
to entrepreneurs is low, the dynamics is characterized by high wages and a prosperous steady
state will be reached. However, if this ratio starts oﬀ high, the wage remains low, and
the economy is trapped in an absorbing, subsistence state. A restricted set of parameters
yields this multiplicity, but we are able to map initial wealth distributions of Tanzania and
Mauritius to the model, and demonstrate how a “bad” initial distribution could have led
Tanzania toward stagnation and a “good” one led Mauritius to prosperity. The one-time
redistribution needed to change the distribution from bad to good is about 4% of total
wealth.
We develop and calibrate our own model, which is in the spirit of Galor and Zeira (1993),
to study the human capital explanation. In this heterogeneous-agent model, developed with
the explicit intent of calibration, high costs of education relative to low income and skill
premium cause the economy to stagnate in a low steady state with minimal educational
attainment. While the model is theoretically capable of yielding multiple steady states, the
benchmark calibration yields only a single stagnant steady state. A continual tax and in-
kind subsidy that eﬀectively redistributes resources from poor households with lower ability
children to those with higher ability children can pry the economy out of stagnation, freeing
2it from dependence on foreign aid. We ﬁnd that a GDP share of education of 3.2% is required
in the calibrated model to produce a Mauritius-like outcome, close to the actual expenditure
share seen in data.
Finally, we consider the more recent politico-economic literature on stagnation. Unlike
the previous models, there is no multiplicity of equilibria here.3 We ﬁrst calibrate the model
of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), who assume that only an educated-wealthy minority
(oligarchy) has political power. There are external beneﬁts to education, which provide
the oligarchs with an incentive to subsidize the education of the poor. However, the newly
educated poor may gain political control, and impose costly redistributive taxes. Under
certain conditions, democratization, which in the model is equivalent to education of the
poor, occurs. We calibrate the model to Tanzanian data and ﬁnd that the no-democratization
condition is met, though a higher than plausible education externality is required. An
education subsidy scheme in which costs are shared between the local wealthy minority
(5.7% of their lifetime income) and foreign aid (8.7% of GDP for seven years) can move
Tanzania to a fully educated democracy.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), consider a “ruler” who trades oﬀ the beneﬁt of adopting
a new technology and getting a percentage of the increased output as taxes, against the cost
of being replaced due to the increased “turbulence” that results from the adoption. Rulers
with a ﬁrm grip on power, as well as those facing a high probability of replacement, innovate,
while those in the middle block technology adoption. We ﬁnd that parameters drawn from
innovating countries can be consistently used to explain politico-economic stagnation in
sSA. However, the model is not amenable to quantifying the costs of policy reforms such as
increasing democratization or lowering political rents.
The models we evaluate are stylized, each abstracting along several dimensions in order to
focus on its main channel.4 Moreover, comprehensive, good-quality data is rarely available for
a particular sSA country. Both these considerations necessitate a ﬂexible approach toward
calibration. Sometimes, this involves ﬁnding any set of parameters that can produce the
stagnation outcome of the model and then evaluating the empirical validity of the parameters,
rather than starting with parameters that seem ap r i o r ireasonable. In order to preserve
other authors’ original intent, we do not modify their models. Our aim is not to merely survey
these models; our calibration and policy experiments are original additions that subject these
models to the rigor of quantitative analysis. None of these models attempts to explain all
t h ei n c o m ed i ﬀerences seen in the data. Therefore, we conﬁne our quantitative analysis to
the stagnation seen in sSA.
3Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), and Durlauf (1993) are a few of the
other models that feature multiplicity.
4As Murphy, Sleifer, and Vishny (1989) note, “... because all our models are highly stylized and capture
what we can only hope to be one aspect of reality, policies suggested by these models should be interpreted
with caution.” (p. 1006)
3What answers can we provide to the questions that motivated this study? First, it is
possible to ﬁnd parametrizations for all models — some empirically more reasonable than
others — that are consistent with stagnation in sSA. But across the models, we ﬁnd that
calibrations that yield multiple equilibria — one prosperity and the other stagnation — are
not particularly robust. When there are multiple steady states, a one-time policy intervention
can alter the initial condition and steer the economy toward the high development steady
state instead of stagnation. On the other hand, when there is a unique low development
steady state, the policy change has to be permanent.5 Given the diﬃculty of obtaining
multiple equilibria, we see the need for caution in advocating one-shot or temporary policies.
Second, our analysis of policy reforms shows that the costs of implementing the policies
suggested by the models are not very high. This is true even in our human capital model,
where we study only permanent policies.
Third, even though the models focus on diﬀerent channels, we ﬁnd that a more complete
picture of the causes of stagnation and policy reforms emerges when we consider them to-
gether. For instance, while our model suggests foreign aid is not required for development,
Bourguignon and Verdier’s (2000) political model shows that foreign aid can act as a seed
in encouraging human capital investments by the local wealthy minority. In general, the
political economy models provide insights into why the seemingly small interventions sug-
gested by other models might be diﬃcult to implement. Implementing democratic reforms
and providing foreign assistance in alignment with the interests of a local oligarchy that can
block reform are inherently diﬃcult to do. Considering the models together also allows us to
identify recurring explanatory factors — the initial income distribution, human capital, and
capital market imperfections — which would be leading candidates for inclusion in a more
comprehensive model of stagnation.
Beyond this, our exercise naturally allows us to identify the relative quantitative strengths
and weaknesses of each model. For instance, the parameters of the political economy models
are harder to calibrate than the technological variables of the other models. However, these
models are the most parsimonious with the fewest number of parameters to calibrate. The
calibrations of the coordination failure and occupational choice explanations need to rely
less on sSA-speciﬁc parameters, which is useful given the erratic availability of data; but the
other models that do rely on speciﬁc parameters have the advantage of explaining a partic-
ular rather than a generic situation of stagnation. We defer a more detailed comparative
evaluation until Section 6, and ﬁrst present the individual analyses. Sections 2 through 5
consider, respectively, the explanations of coordination failure, occupational choice, human
5As Banerjee and Newman (1993) note, “Under the guidance of the linear model, which usually displays
global stability, one is led to conclude that continual redistributive taxation, with the distortion it often
entails, is required for achieveing equity. The nonlinear model, by contrast, raises the possibility that one-
time redistributions may have permanent eﬀects, thereby alleviating the need for distortionary policy.” (p.
296)
4capital accumulation, and the political economy. For each, we present a brief summary of the
model, the calibration strategy, the potential of the calibrated model to explain stagnation,
and the outcome of policy experiments. Section 7 concludes.
2 Coordination Failure
We consider the work of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) to analyze coordination failure.
Here, a ﬁrm’s investment exerts a pecuniary externality on other ﬁrms by increasing the
market size or decreasing infrastructure costs. Since individual ﬁrms do not take this eﬀect
into account, there could be a coordination failure which causes stagnation. Coordination
of investment across sectors could give the economy a “Big Push” and move it to the good
equilibrium; simultaneous industrialization could be self-sustaining even if a sector cannot
aﬀord to industrialize on its own.
2.1 Model
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (MSV) ﬁrst consider a unit interval of goods with the utility
function,
R 1
0 lnx(q)dq, which implies equal expenditure shares. There are L units of labor,
with wage being the numeraire. Each sector has a competitive fringe, which converts labor to
output one for one, and a potential monopolist with an increasing returns to scale technology,
each unit of labor yielding α>1 units of output. For a ﬁrm to acquire the increasing returns
technology (become “industrialized”) and gain monopoly over an entire sector, it has to incur
a ﬁxed cost of F units of labor. Since the ﬁrm faces the entire demand curve for the good,
given income y, the ﬁrm’s proﬁti sπ = ay,w h e r ea ≡ (1 − 1/α) is the markup. If n
sectors industrialize, aggregate proﬁts are Π = nπ. These are repatriated to the households,
implying an income of y = Π + L. Without any industrialization, income is L. The income
increases with the degree of industrialization, n; an industrializing sector gives proﬁts back
to consumers who spend it on all goods and raise the proﬁts of all industrialized ﬁrms. This
basic setup gives only one equilibrium — stagnation or industrialization — depending on the
parameters. If it is unproﬁtable for one ﬁrm to industrialize when its income is only L,
and if it industrializes anyway, it reduces aggregate income making it more unproﬁtable for
all other ﬁrms to industrialize. MSV then present three extensions to ensure a ﬁrm that
engages in an unproﬁtable investment can still beneﬁt other sectors, making it likely they
ﬁnd investment proﬁtable. This yields multiple equilibria and the possibility of a Big Push.
The ﬁrst extension assumes that to attract workers away from CRS farm work to IRS
manufacturing, ﬁrms have to pay a premium, since working in factories entails a disutility of
v. Given a farm wage of one, the factory wage is 1+v. The condition for no industrialization
(stagnation) to occur is L(1 − (1 + v)/α) − F(1 + v) < 0. If a ﬁrm expects no other ﬁrm
to industrialize, and therefore aggregate income to be L, it does not incur the ﬁxed cost of
F units of factory labor. The condition for all ﬁrms to expect a high level of income and
5sales from simultaneous industrialization and be willing to incur the ﬁxed cost is α(L − F)−
L(1 + v) > 0. If both conditions are satisﬁed, both equilibria are possible. It is convenient
to write the condition that parameters need to satisfy for multiplicity as
(1 + v) <α(1 − F/L) < (1 + v)+αvF/L. (1)













γ ; the intertemporal elasticity of 1/(1 − θ)
and elasticity of substitution across goods is 1/(1 − γ). The discount factor is β.I nt h eﬁrst
period, only the CRS technology is available. This is also available in the second period;
however, a potential monopolist can invest F units of labor in the ﬁrst period to acquire
the IRS technology in the second period. The proﬁt for such a monopolist is given by
π =( 1 /(1 + r))ay2 − F, where r is the interest rate, y2 the second period income, and a is
the markup deﬁned earlier. The condition for no sector to industrialize is (1/(1 + r))aL −
F<0. The demand ﬁrms expect to obtain in second period is too low for them to break
even on their investments, and the realized income is indeed low. The income of L in
each period is consistent with the interest factor (1/(1 + r)) = β. The condition for an
industrialized equilibrium is (1/(1 + r))aαL − F>0, where the interest factor consistent
with a ﬁrst period income of (L − F) and a second period income of αL is (1/(1 + r)) =
β (αL/(L − F))
θ−1 . The increase in investment demand by the ﬁrms increases the interest
rate, decreasing the discount factor a ﬁrm uses to assess proﬁtability. The eﬀect of increased
income from monopoly proﬁts (repatriated to consumers) has to dominate this decrease in






¢1−θ <β a<F/ L , (2)
which uses the above-mentioned interest factors.
The third extension considers an investment in infrastructure, say a railroad. The θ =1 ,
γ =0 , version of the above utility is used. Though MSV ignore β by setting it to one, we
retain it to facilitate realistic calibration. CRS technologies can be set up anywhere and
don’t use the railroad. IRS technologies are location speciﬁc and need the railroad to sell
their products. A fraction n of the sectors need a ﬁrst-period ﬁxed cost of F1 units of labor
to industrialize while the remaining (1 − n) need ﬁxed cost F2 >F 1.I t c o s t s R units of
labor to build the railroad in ﬁrst period and marginal cost of its use is zero. The type of
the ﬁrm is private information and the monopolist cannot price discriminate. It is assumed
that even if all type 1 ﬁrms industrialize, the surplus generated will not cover R; both types
of ﬁrm must industrialize.
There are two considerations — whether the railroad is built even if it is eﬃcient, and
whether multiplicity can exist even if the railroad is built. The condition for an equilibrium
in which the railroad is built and all sectors industrialize is (1/(1 + r))aαL − F2 >R .
6Given the inability to price discriminate, the railroad company extracts all the surplus of
high-cost ﬁrms and extracts the same from low-cost ﬁrms, leaving them with a positive
surplus. With θ =1 , there is no interest rate eﬀect and (1/(1 + r)) = β. Even when railroad
building is eﬃcient, that is, when (1/(1 + r))aαL − nF1 − (1 − n)F2 >R ,if the stronger
industrialization condition is not satisﬁed, the railroad will not be built. The condition for
no industrialization is (1/(1 + r))aL−F1 < 0, where the interest factor is β. The condition
for multiplicity is, therefore
(F2/L + R/L)/α < βa < F1/L. (3)
If this condition holds, the uncertainty concerning equilibrium selection might cause the rail-
road to not be built, since the railroad will be proﬁtable if the economy industrializes but
incur a large loss if no industrialization occurs. This, in addition to the inability to price dis-
criminate, might warrant subsidization of railroad construction. Additionally, coordination
of investments might be required to avoid multiplicity of equilibria.
2.2 Calibration
We realize the need to be ﬂexible in calibrating stylized models written with the aim of
highlighting particular forces of economic development analytically. Therefore, for this and
other models, we sometimes resort to parameters that “work”, and then assess if they are
empirically reasonable, rather than follow the usual strategy of ﬁxing some of the parameters
a priori using independent evidence, and calibrating others to match empirical targets.
The parameters that are common to all three models are α, the degree of increasing
returns, and F/L, the normalized cost of adopting the increasing-returns technology. Hall
(1988) presents estimates of the markup ratio (price to marginal cost) in the US economy,
which corresponds to the α of the MSV model. The estimates for one-digit industries range
from 1.864 for services to 3.791 for trade. Hall (1990) presents direct evidence on the IRS
parameter, which ranges from 1.08 in services to 10.03 for transportation. We ﬁnd that a
value of α =3 , which is roughly the value for nondurables in both estimates, works for all
three models. This might seem like a high value, especially in light of the highest value of
1.72 reported in Basu and Fernald (1997) for the entire private economy. However, the ratio
of the income between the industrialized and non-industrialized economies at the end of the
second period in the two-period models is also α, and from this viewpoint a value of 3 does
not appear to be too high.
In the context of the MSV model, the quantity F/L can be interpreted as the fraction of
either labor or resources devoted to technology adoption. We ﬁnd the share of skilled labor
in total costs a proxy that works. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) view adoption in this
fashion and turn to data from Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) for empirical support. The data
in Bartel and Lichtenberg indicates that the ratio of earnings of those with 13 or more years
of education to those with less was fairly stable at 0.6 in US manufacturing from the 60s
7through the 80s. This implies a skill share in total labor costs of 0.375. This is higher than
other candidate proxies — the actual employment share of educated workers, which ranges
from .158 to .271 during that period, and the 12% of the population who are entrepreneurs
(De Nardi and Cagetti (2003)).
For the factory premium model, we use the rural-urban wage gap to proxy for the factory
disutility v. The USDA’s Economic research service reports rural wages of about 70% of
urban wages, which implies v =0 .4286. This is comparable to the value of 0.376 derived from
BLS weekly earnings ratio in the goods-producing industry to the private service-providing
industry.6
For the investment model, we assume a base annual real interest rate of 8%. This
implies an annual β of 0.9259.7 This annual value has to be compounded over a long enough
gestation period that is typical of large-scale industrial projects. Given the varying gestation
periods observed for diﬀerent industries, we study a range of values for the compounded β:
0.5401 for 8-year compounding, 0.4631 for 10 years, and 0.3151 for 15 years. Whether the
industrialization condition is met or not depends strongly on the value used for θ,w h i c h
controls the eﬀect of deferred consumption on the interest rate. The easiest to consider is
θ =1 , which implies inﬁnite substitutability across periods. An alternate interpretation is
a small open economy in which there are no interest rate eﬀects of increased investment.
Other values we use for θ range from 0.35 to 0.75, which yield elasticity of substitutions of
1.5 to 4. While this elasticity is not far from the value of 1 often used in the calibration of
macroeconomic models, it is much larger than the 0.2 to 0.4 ﬁgure reported by Patterson
and Pesaran (1992) for the US and UK, which imply a θ of -4 to -1.5.8 Any value of θ less
than 0.35 causes the interest rate eﬀect to dominate and makes industrialization impossible.9
For the railroad cost, R/L, in the infrastructure model, we use the information from
the World Development Report 1994, that public infrastructure investment in developing
countries ranges from 2 to 8%, with an average of 4%. These ﬁgures are in the ballpark of
the US infrastructure spending, which was between 2.5% and 3% of GDP during 1956-1991.10
We use the ﬁgures of 3% and 8% to cover a broad enough range. This model extension also
6The values chosen for α and v satisfy the MSV condition of α − 1 >v ,for the increasing returns to be
suﬃciently high to warrant the higher factory wages.
7As will be seen, what matters is the annual β compounded by a gestation period. Diﬀerent values of the
annual β and years are therefore compatible with the ﬁnal values used.
8Guvenen (2003) argues that a higher elasticity would result when wealth data, rather than consumption
data, is used. These higher estimates are connected to aggregate investment and output, and seem more
relevant for our purposes.
9MSV assume α<1/γ to ensure a suﬃciently inelastic demand. For our chosen value of α, we need
γ<1/3, which implies an elasticity of substitution amongg o o d so fl e s st h a n1 . 5 . F o ri n s t a n c e ,t h eC o b b -
Douglas aggregator
U 1
0 lnxi (q)dq, i =1 ,2, satisﬁes this constraint.
10See the Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s, Trends in Public Infrastructural Spending, 1999.
8requires that entry costs be broken into low and high costs. In line with our calibration of
F/L, we use for F1/L and F2/L, the lower and upper ends of the range of labor cost share
of highly educated workers as reported in Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987): 0.307 for Wood
Containers, and 0.433 for Electronic Components.11
Table 1: Parameters for the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny Models
Parameter Value Comment
α 3 IRS parameter for nondurables; Hall (1988, 1990)
F/L 0.375 Skill share in total labor costs; Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987)
v 0.4286 From rural-urban wage gap; USDA
β 0.3151 - 0.5401 Annual value of 0.9259 compounded over 8 to 15 years
θ 0.35 - 0.75 “Closed” economy; intertemporal elasticity of 1.5 to 4
1 “Open” economy; inﬁnite intertemporal elasticity
R/L 0.03 - 0.08 Public infrastructure investment; World Development Report 1994
F1/L 0.307 Upper end of skill share in labor costs; Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987)
F2/L 0.433 Lower end of skill share in labor costs; Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987)
Table 1 presents the parameters we use.12 We have assumed that these parameters are
“structural” and hold across all economies; this is easier to defend if we take the view that
all parameters are purely technological. This allows us to assume, in the spirit of MSV,
that some economies stagnate purely on account of bad expectations, and focus on Big Push
policies to undo these expectations. However, we later discuss the possibility of identifying
the ﬁxed costs with business entry costs, which are much higher in sSA than in OECD
countries and even the more prosperous countries within sSA.
2.3 What the Calibrated Models Explain
The benchmark values satisfy the multiplicity condition in the factory premium model, (1),
by yielding: 1.4286 < 1.875 < 1.9108. High enough values for v, F/L, and α are needed for
the condition to hold. If the alternate value of 0.376 is used for v, the no-industrialization
condition will cease to hold. This also happens if the share of entrepreneurs in the population,
0.12, is used for F/L. If a lower value of α, say 2, is used, the degree of increasing returns is
not enough to warrant the ﬁxed costs and only the no-industrialization condition is satisﬁed.
In the open economy version of the two-period investment model (with θ =1 ), the con-
dition for multiplicity, (2), is satisﬁed for values of β involving 8 or more years of project
gestation period. For instance, with 8-year compounding, the condition is satisﬁed as:
11Another interpretation of diﬀering ﬁxed costs could be that some ﬁrms are more eﬃcient than others
at adopting similar technologies. However, given greater data availability, we have chosen the interpretation
that diﬀering industry-speciﬁc technologies are the source of diﬀerent ﬁxed costs.
12Recall that the measure of low-cost ﬁrms, n,e n t e r st h ee ﬃciency condition. Our benchmark parameters
satisfy the stricter industrialization condition. Therefore, we do not need a value for n.
90.125 < 0.3602 < 0.375. Lower values for F/L will necessitate compounding by longer
periods. The condition for no industrialization will cease to hold for a high β,l o wF/L
combination — the discounted gains from industrialization exceed the cost. Greater variation
in α can be tolerated for this model; for instance a value of 1.5 will work.
The closed economy version of the model is highly sensitive to the value assumed for
θ, and also for β. The following combinations of parameters yield multiplicity when the
benchmark value of F/L is used: θ =0 .35 − 0.5 and β =0 .5401 (8 years), θ =0 .425 − 0.45
and β =0 .4631 (10 years), and θ =0 .675 − 0.75 and β =0 .3151 (15 years). Any value of
θ lower than those speciﬁed will decrease the intertemporal elasticity of substitution enough
to cause the interest rate eﬀect to dominate; only the no-industrialization condition will be
left standing. As in the open economy version, a high β,a n dal o wF/L will break the no
industrialization condition.
Finally, the infrastructure model satisﬁes the multiplicity condition (3) for a 11-year β
of 0.4288. With an R/L of 0.03, the condition is satisﬁed as 0.1543 < 0.2858 < 0.307, and
also for an R/L of 0.08, with the ﬁrst number now becoming 0.171. Since the relevant ﬁxed
cost is now lower (as F1/L < F/L), any higher value for β will make the ﬁxed investment
attractive enough to break the no industrialization condition. Lower values of α, say 2.5,
will help in this regard, but tighten the condition needed for industrialization.
In summary, it is possible to ﬁnd parameters for which the multiplicity conditions hold
for all three models of MSV, which warrants the study of policies involving a Big Push.
However, the open economy version of the two-period investment model is the most robust
to changes in parameters. A high enough value for ﬁxed costs is crucial in all three models
to satisfy the no-industrialization condition, which, given the interest in stagnation, is the
more important of the two conditions.
2.4 Policy Experiments
The MSV models identify conditions under which a given set of parameters satisfy both in-
dustrialization and stagnation. However, they do not take a stance on equilibrium selection.
Therefore, we assume that extrinsic conditions resulted in the selection of the stagnant equi-
librium in sub-Saharan Africa (sSA). The task in this subsection then is to identify policies
that would give a Big Push to the economy to pry it out of stagnation, and explore whether
such policies have worked in the region. MSV mention the policies of investment subsidies
and coordination, but do not explicitly analyze them. However, it is fairly straightforward
to derive the minimum rate of investment subsidy required in each of the three models, to
break the stagnation condition and spur industrialization. The aim would be to reduce the
eﬀective cost of ﬁxed investment F by enough, say to (1 − s)F, such that even if a potential
monopolist does not expect other sectors to industrialize, and therefore expects an aggregate
income of only L, he would individually ﬁnd it proﬁtable to industrialize. We assume that
10the cost of funding these subsidies, sF, is met by taxing income.13
First consider the factory premium model. We can convert the stagnation condition
L(1 − (1 + v)/α) − F(1 + v) < 0 into an industrialization condition by writing
(L − sF)(1− (1 + v)/α) − (1 − s)F(1 + v) > 0.
For the parameter values assumed in Table 1, this implies a minimum investment subsidy
rate of 3.5%. As a fraction of the stagnant income L, the income tax payments, sF, are
1.3%.
The condition for stagnation in the two-period investment model is (1/(1 + r))aL−F<
0. However, we cannot set the interest rate factor to β, if we expect to fund investment subsi-
dies from taxes on ﬁrst period income. It would have to be consistent with the consumption
of L − sF and L in the two periods. Therefore, we write the condition for the required
subsidy as
β ((L − sF)/L)
1−θ aL − (1 − s)F>0.
Financing investment subsidies by taxing ﬁrst period consumption automatically accom-
plishes the MSV recommendation of “discouraging current consumption.” The θ =1case
is again the easiest to consider. With a β computed for 8 years, the minimum subsidy rate
required is about 4%; as a fraction of the stagnant income, income tax payments are 1.5%.
These rates are highly sensitive to β. If a 10-year compounding is used, these rates increase
to 17.3% and 6.5% respectively.
When θ<1, the ﬁrst term in the above condition also decreases with s, reﬂecting the
increased interest rate needed to induce consumers to postpone consumption. However,
it declines less steeply in s than the second term, and a unique minimum subsidy rate,
0 <s<1, can be found. As θ (the intertemporal substitutability) decreases, the minimum
subsidy increases; the monopolist discounts more due to the increased interest rate, and
requires higher subsidies. When a 8-year β is used, the subsidy rate is 4.8% when θ is 0.5,
and 5.2% when θ is 0.35; the corresponding income tax rates are 1.8% and 1.9%. As in the
θ =1case, these rates are highly sensitive to β. With a 10-year β, and θ set to 0.45, the
minimum subsidy rate required is 20.9% and the income tax rate is 7.8%.
In the infrastructure model, in which θ has already been set to 1, and therefore the
relevant discount factor for the monopolist is just β, the condition to overcome stagnation
is simply
βaL− (1 − s)F1 > 0.
Using the parameters of the previous subsection, we get a minimum subsidy rate of 6.9%,
which translates to an income tax rate of 2.6%.
13Since there is no labor-leisure choice, we need not diﬀerentiate between a lumpsum and a proportional
income tax.
11Conditional on using parameters that satisfy the criteria for multiplicity, we ﬁnd that
modest rates of investment subsidy, 4 to 7% for most cases, are adequate to trigger develop-
ment in an economy stuck in the stagnant equilibrium. Has there been any sSA economy that
has successfully developed by following polices of market expansion, simultaneous industri-
alization, and investment tax credit or subsidy? The economy of Mauritius was languishing
until 1970, following policies of import substitution. The establishment of export processing
zones (EPZs) in 1970, with tax incentives, exemptions from import duties, and preferential
credit facilities, boosted the economy, increased investment, and provided global markets
to Mauritian ﬁrms, especially in textiles. The average annual growth rate between 1971
and 1977 was 8.3%. The Mauritian economy rebounded from a slowdown during 1978-1983,
to record annual real output growth of 7% during 1984-1988, and growth rates of close to
6% during the recent years. In 1991, manufacturing was 23.3% of GDP, with EPZs alone
accounting for 12.1%. Exports of manufactured goods rose from a negligible share of all
exports in 1961 to 67% in 1991, nearly all of it from EPZs. Mauritius’ tax code has been
characterized by generous investment tax credits for industrial, manufacturing, shipping,
and tourist activities, permitting, for instance, a deduction from income tax equal to 30%
of the cash paid up as share capital.14 By 1998, Mauritius had grown enough to have a per
capita GDP of $8,236, more than ten times the per capita GDP of the worst-performing sSA
countries. Even though the MSV models consider closed economies, the Mauritian drive to-
ward expanding markets and increasing economies of scale by promoting exports, especially
via investment incentives, are in the spirit of the Big Push policies.
2.5 Discussion
We ﬁnd that empirically reasonable parameters yield multiple equilibria in the MSV model.
Even if only one equilibrium obtains, provided it is stagnation, the policies discussed in the
previous subsection would be relevant. In the context of static and two-period models it is a
bit tricky to address the issue of whether a one-time policy intervention or a continuous one
is needed to get an economy out of stagnation. The expectational nature of multiplicity and
the types of polices needed to break the “bad” expectations leads us to interpret the policy
intervention as one-shot. This would be especially true if technological regressions after an
economy becomes industrialized are rare in a multi-period version of the model, and are slow
when they do occur.
A narrow view of the ﬁxed costs in MSV would identify them only with technological
costs; however, a broader view would include the costs of regulation. Regulation costs of
starting a business, which are 224.2% of per capita income in sSA, but only 8.1% for OECD
14See Lamusse (1995), Mauritius at http://www.taxhavenco.com/osm/taxhavens/Mauritius.html,
and Structural Transformation of the Mauritian Economy: 1960s - Beyond 2000,a t
http://ncb.intnet.mu/medrc/beyond.htm for details.
12countries and 11.3% in the prosperous Botswana even within sSA, could also be potentially
identiﬁed with these ﬁxed costs.15 The huge costs seen for sSA imply that only the stagnation
condition would be satisﬁed for all three MSV models. This suggests a complementary policy
intervention, namely regulatory reforms to ease entry costs. However, estimating the cost of
such reforms would be considerably harder than the tax and subsidy analysis we conduct.
3 Occupational Choice
We consider the work of Banerjee and Newman (1995), in which the presence of imperfect
capital markets and heterogeneity in wealth aﬀect occupational decisions of agents, and
hence economic and institutional development. We focus on a particular example, in which
both a stagnant and prosperous steady state are possible; if the initial distribution is tilted
toward the poor, with a small measure of middle-income agents, stagnation can result.
3.1 Model
Banerjee and Newman (BN) consider a two-period overlapping generations setup with a con-
tinuum of agents of measure one.16 Agents derive utility according to the function cγb1−γ−z,
where c is consumption, b is bequest given to the child, and z is labor expended. If income
is y, the indirect utility is δy − z, where δ ≡ γγ (1 − γ)
1−γ . There are four possible occupa-
tions: (1) Subsisters who derive return from a “backyard” technology, which has gross return
b r<1/(1 − γ). (2) Workers, who are hired by entrepreneurs at the competitively determined
wage v (subsisters are viewed as potential workers whose services are not in demand). (3)
Self-employed agents, who require I units of capital to start a project with random gross
return r : r0 with probability (1 − q) and r1 with probability q, with the mean return denoted
by r. (4) Entrepreneurs, who can manage µ>1 workers, each needing I units of capital.
The random gross return is r0 with the same mean return r : r0
0 with probability (1 − q0)
and r0
1 with probability q0. The worker / subsister group is denoted by L, self-employed by
M, and entrepreneurs by U — the lower, middle, and upper income groups respectively. An
individual’s state is w, the bequest given by the parent, while the aggregate state is Gt (w),
the distribution of wealth.
Self-employed agents and entrepreneurs need to borrow to ﬁnance their projects. En-
forcement is imperfect. Any agent who puts down a collateral of w and borrows L, can
run away forfeiting collateral, but will get caught with probability π, and suﬀer a monetary
punishment of F. Therefore, loans made satisfy L ≤ w +( πF/b r).
The measures of the agents in the three income groups are denoted by pi, i ∈ {L,M,U}.
Entrepreneurs demand a total amount of labor of µpU, while the maximum supply of labor
15See Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).
16BN introduce the notion of economically active agents, but set this measure to one eventually.
13by workers is pL. Only two equilibrium wages are possible. The low wage of v =1 /δ is the
minimum wage needed to induce subsisters to work and results when pL >µ p U. The high
wage of v ≡ ((µ − 1)/µ)I (r − b r) is the maximum wage that will leave the entrepreneurs
indiﬀerent to being self-employed instead, and results when pL 6 µpU.
Given the capital market imperfection, occupational choice is driven by wealth thresholds.
Agents with wealth w ∈ [0,w∗], where w∗ = I − (πF/b r), are workers (but if wage is v,t h e
labor market clears by some workers idling). Those with w ∈ [w∗,w∗∗], qualify for a loan
to ﬁnance self employment, where w∗∗ = µI − (πF/b r). Finally, agents with w ∈ [w∗∗,w],
where w is the highest possible wealth level that can be sustained in the long run, qualify to
become entrepreneurs (but if wage is v, they are indiﬀerent to being self-employed, and the
labor market clears by pL/µ becoming entrepreneurs and the remaining pU − pL/µ staying
self-employed). It follows that pL = Gt (w∗),p U =1− Gt (w∗∗), and pM =1− pL − pU.
The bequest given from current income induces the distributional dynamics in wealth.
That is, wt+1 (wt)=bt =( 1− γ)yt (wt). This is not a linear system since the transition
rule itself changes depending on the current distribution and therefore the equilibrium wage.
However, this wage takes only one of two values, v and v. Moreover, attention is restricted to
parameter conﬁgurations that yield tractable transition functions. If every starting wealth
level within a given income group for a given realization of the return implies a transition
into as i n g l eincome group in the next period — for example, children of all the M−agents
who have a good realization this period start next period as U-agents — then the two state
variables, pL,p U, are suﬃcient statistics for the distribution.
We focus on BN’s example of prosperity and stagnation.17 This case results when self-
employment earnings have a large spread and entrepreneurial spreads are even larger. When
the low wage prevails, the low income state is absorbing; bad realizations in the middle
and upper income states can push their next generations into this absorbing state. When
the wage is high, the low income state allows escape into the middle income group and
through it to the upper income group for good return realizations. Therefore, movements
from the middle and upper income groups to the lower income group caused by bad return
realizations are purely transitory. The initial presence of a substantial measure of middle-
class agents is crucial for a good long-run outcome. The higher measure of middle-class
agents implies a lower measure of poor agents, increasing the chance of a high wage economy
with the concomitant beneﬁts of transition described above. Moreover, the high mobility
of the middle-class can increase the measure of entrepreneurs and the wage over time even
when starting from a low-wage situation. Given this, the authors trace out the dynamics for
two scenarios. If the starting ratio of poor (L) to wealthy (U) is low, or high but with a lot
of middle-class agents (M), the prosperous steady state will be reached. However, if the L to
U ratio starts oﬀ high, with few M-agents to begin with, both the U and L-agents grow at
17The transition function for this example is given in their Figure 4 and the phase diagram in Figure 5.
The diﬀerential equations for pL and pU are given in equations (6) and (7).
14the expense of the M-agents and the economy collapses to stagnation. Which steady state
the economy ends at depends exclusively on the initial wealth distribution.
3.2 Calibration
As with the MSV models, here too we ﬁnd parameters that work and then assess them for
empirical plausibility.18 To capture the spirit of the BN model, we assume that all the model
parameters are structural (invariant) across countries and diﬀerences in long-run attainment
result only from diﬀerences in the initial distribution of wealth.
We assume each model period (generation) is 20 years.19 The gross subsistence or risk-
free return is, b r =1 .1, which translates into an annual return of 0.48%. According to
Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002), average annualized real return on long-term bonds
across sixteen countries during 1900 through 2001, was 0.7%. So the assumed ﬁgure appears
reasonable. The utility parameter γ is set to 0.9, which results in δ =0 .72. This value
of γ implies an intergenerational persistence in the model of (1 − γ)b r =0 .11. While early
estimates of this parameter in data were in the 0.2 to 0.25 range, according to Stokey (1998)
later estimates, which correct for problems in the data, are in the 0.5 to 0.6 range. These
are much larger than the value implied by our parameters. The “span of control” parameter
µ is 2.2. Ortin-Áugel and Salas-Fumás (2002, Table 2) estimate the log of span of control to
be between 1.024 and 1.5642 for a general manager, depending on the functional area — the
value we use is in the ballpark of the 2.78 ﬁgure implied by the lower end of the above range.
We use r0
0 =1 .3,r0
1 =1 0 .2, for entrepreneurial returns, which translate to annual bad and
good returns of 1.32% and 12.31%. These appear plausible given stock market returns.20
We use a probability of the good outcome of q0 =0 .4607 which yields an average return
of r =5 .4. A n n u a l i z e d ,t h i si s8 . 8 % ,w h i c hi sab i th igher than the 6.3% historical return
presented in Burtless (1999). The self-employed returns we need are r0 =1 ,r 1 =1 8 .6, which
in annual terms are 0% and 15.74%. The probability of the good outcome q has to be set to
0.25, to equate the mean returns for both types of project. If one interprets entrepreneurial
(large project) and self-employed (small project) returns as the returns to public and private
equity respectively, the higher spread for self-employed returns is consistent with the higher
18The strategy of starting with data-driven parameters does not allow us to replicate the prosperity versus
stagnation example in a way that preserves the tractability of the BN model. However, it is important to
note this does not rule out multiple steady states in a more general setup; we do not pursue the computation
of such a setup as it would lead us far aﬁeld of BN’s treatment.
19This choice mainly plays a role in interpreting the project returns in annual terms and transition times
in years.
20See, for instance, Chart 1, in Burtless (1999), which conveniently presents 15-year average annual returns
from 1871-1998. While the high value we use corresponds quite closely to his data, the low value is higher
than the slightly negative return he obtains. Note that the model constrains all returns to be positive.
15dispersion for private equity reported by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).21
We interpret v and v as the wages in poor and rich countries, anticipating their steady
states. The ratio of wages, p ≡ v/v, is set to 5. Data on nominal wage diﬀerences across
individual countries are too widely dispersed to be of use in our calibration. Ashenfelter
and Juradja (2001, Table 1) compute real wages in terms of Big Macs per hour of work
across 27 countries at vastly diﬀerent levels of development. Calculating the averages of
these wages in the top and bottom quartiles, we obtain a PPP-adjusted wage diﬀerential of
7.4, which is in the ballpark of the p used. Using the expressions for the wages, we can back
out I = pµ/(δ (r − b r)(µ − 1)), which yields, I =2 .95.
Let x denote the minimum fraction of a loan needed as collateral. Since w∗ is the
minimum wealth needed to qualify for a loan, we write w∗ = xI = I −(πF/b r),w h i c hi nt u r n
implies πF =( 1− x)Ib r. We require x =0 .225, which yields πF =2 .515;w ed on o tn e e d
to pin down π and F separately. Using this in the expressions for the thresholds, we get,
w∗ =0 .6638, and w∗∗ =4 .2054. We compute the maximum possible wealth, w,a s6.3.T h e
collateral to loan ratio at w∗∗ (for the marginal entrepreneur) is w∗∗/µI =6 4 .8%. As a point
of empirical contact, The Fed’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending, 2004, reports that the
percentage of value of commercial and industrial loans made by domestic banks, which we
interpret as entrepreneurial loans, secured by collateral is 65%.
In summary, while the parameters that are able to replicate the stagnation and prosperity
example need to be rationalized ex post, most of them appear empirically relevant, with the
preference parameter the least plausible. The parameters used are presented in Table 2.22 A
low steady state of p∗
L =1 ,p ∗
M = p∗
U =0(stagnation) and a high steady state of p∗
L =0 .4063,
p∗
M =0 .4063,p ∗
U =0 .1873 (prosperity) result.23
21Their use of “entrepreneurship” diﬀers from BN’s use of the word. BN connect “factories” with entrepre-
neurs and “cottages” with the self-employed. Therefore, it appears reasonable to connect the private equity
of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (MVJ) to the self-employed returns of BN. MVJ note that the “average
return to private equity is similar to that of public equity,” which is consistent with the BN assumption of
equal average returns for both types of projects.
Incidentally, compounded real returns we compute from MVJ’s minimum and maximum nominal returns




1 we use. While their lowest
private equity return is negative in the cross-section, we assume a value of zero for r0,t h el o w e s tr e t u r n
consistent with model assumptions. The value we use for r1 is close to their 3rd quartile return.
22Even small deviations from this combination of parameters cause the tractability of the transition func-
tions that permit the characterization of prosperity versus stagnation to break down. It should also be noted
that we fail to match the BN transition function for the high wage in one respect that does not seem crucial.
With the bad realization, entrepreneurial incomes are negative, even though expected incomes are positive.
We, therefore, need to assume an insurance scheme, presumably funded by the government from lumpsum
taxes, that will cover losses and leave the children in the low-income category next period with zero rather
than negative wealth.
23The measure of entrepreneurs in the high steady state (18.73%) is higher than the 12% number reported,
for instance, by De Nardi and Cagetti (2003), but in the same order of magnitude.
16Table 2: Parameters for the Banerjee-Newman Model
Parameter Value Comment
γ 0.9 Utility parameter; implied intergenerational persistence of 0.11; compare with Stokey (1998)
b r 1.1 Annual risk free rate of 0.48% compounded over 20 years; compare with Dimson et al. (2002)
µ 2.2 Span of control; Ortin-Áugel and Salas-Fumás (2002)
r0
0 1.3 Entrepreneur’s low annual return of 1.32% compounded; compare with Burtless (1999)
r0
1 10.2 Entrepreneur’s high annual return of 12.31% compounded; compare with Burtless (1999)
q0 0.4607 Probability of high entrepreneurial return; determines average return r below
r0 1 Self-employed low annual return of 0%; compare with Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
r1 18.6 Self-employed high return of 15.74%; compare with Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
q 0.25 Probability of high self-employed return; to get average return r below
r 5.4 Annual average return of 8.8%; compare with Burtless (1999)
I 2.95 Backed out from rich-poor wage ratio of 5; Ashenfelter and Juradja (2001)
πF 2.515 Implied collateral to loan ratio of 64.8%; Fed’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending 2004
3.3 What the Calibrated Model Explains
As mentioned earlier, the BN model explains prosperity versus stagnation based on initial
income distribution. Can we ﬁnd examples of sSA countries that can illustrate this? We
consider the examples of Tanzania and Mauritius. Considering two economies in the same
sSA region would be in the spirit of BN of holding all parameters except the initial wealth
distribution constant across countries, while abstracting from institutional and other factors.
The relative prosperity of Mauritius was discussed in Section 2. In contrast, Tanzania had a
PPP adjusted per capita GNP of only $483 in 1998. Can diﬀering distributions of income in
the two countries during prior years explain how a part of this diﬀerence could have arisen?
Answering this requires two sets of details to be addressed — the computation of the dynamic
paths, and the mapping of empirical initial distributions to the model measures pL,p M,p U.
There is a system of two linear diﬀerential equations in pL and pU for each of the two wage
regimes. Exact solutions can be computed to these linear systems.24 In practice, we start
from the neighborhood of a given steady state and work backward by reversing the original
diﬀerential equations. By setting the initial deviations from the steady state appropriately,
one could, in principle, trace out all the paths that lead to this steady state.25 Computation





= a1iV1i exp(λ1it)+a2iV2i exp(λ2it),i = L,H.
where Vi is the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue λi. Each system has two negative eigenvalues.The
constants aji are pinned down by the initial conditions for pL and pU. The hat notation refers to deviations
from the steady state values. The MATLAB program used for the computations are available from the
authors on request.
25If we instead work forward from a given initial condition, we will not know the steady state we will end
17of several transition paths conﬁrms the dynamic behavior summarized earlier. A substantial
measure of middle-income (self-employed) agents is needed to the set the economy on the
path toward prosperity.
While computing transition paths and mapping a given initial condition to a steady
state can be done entirely in terms of the summary distribution statistics, pL,p U, using
income distribution data to ﬁrst back out the initial conditions of an economy requires a
knowledge of the entire wealth distribution, which the model does not track. Therefore, we
make the simplifying assumption that the entire mass of agents in a given wealth interval
is concentrated at the midpoint of the interval: pL at w∗/2,p M at (w∗ + w∗∗)/2, and pU
at (w∗∗ + w)/2. We use poverty headcount from the World Development Indicators to pin
down pL. We then solve for a pU such that the income Gini coeﬃcient calculated from the
piecewise linear Lorenz curve of the model matches the income Gini reported in Deininger
and Squire (1996).
Poverty headcounts are available sporadically and only for recent years. For this reason,
we are forced to assume that the poverty measure presented for later dates is also relevant
for earlier dates. For instance, for Tanzania, we assume that the percentage of people living
below the international poverty line of $2 per day of 59.7% in 1993 is also relevant for 1977,
when its Gini coeﬃcient was 0.52. Likewise, the only poverty headcount data we have for
Mauritius is 10.6% in the 90s, which we assume is relevant for 1980 (a year close to the 1977
used for Tanzania), when its Gini coeﬃcient was 0.457. Our method of mapping distribution
data to model measures yields the following “initial” conditions: pL =0 .597,p M =0 .1071,
and pU =0 .2959, for Tanzania, and pL =0 .106,p M =0 .4323, and pU =0 .4617, for
Mauritius.
As one might suspect, given the high initial measure of middle-income agents, Mauritius
is more likely to reach the high steady state. Indeed, we are able to compute paths from
initial conditions that are very close to the above starting distributions implied by the data
(pL =0 .5999,p M =0 .1057, and pU =0 .2944, for Tanzania, and pL =0 .1026,p M =0 .4332,
and pU =0 .4642, for Mauritius), such that Tanzania heads toward the stagnant steady state
and Mauritius heads toward the prosperous steady state.26 Most of the convergence occurs
in two generations.
up at, and the computation of deviations would have to be done by trial and error. However, hitting an exact
initial condition would involve trial and error when we work backward, a process which we did not ﬁnd too
onerous. The computation also checks for switches in the wage regime along a path.
26The ratios of GDP per capita in the prosperous to the stagnant steady state is 38, more than twice the
ratio of 17 seen in data between Mauritius and Tanzania. This discrepancy could arise from our assumption
that the entire mass within a wealth interval is concentrated at the midpoint.
183.4 Policy Experiments
BN note that given the multiplicity of steady states, a one-time intervention is all that is
needed to get an economy to the right distribution that would take it to prosperity instead
of stagnation. It is easier to consider a redistribution of start of period wealth than of end of
period income. We can view this as an unexpected imposition of an estate tax once bequest
decisions of the previous generation have been made. Feasibility requires that the new level
of aggregate wealth does not exceed the old level. Continuing with the assumption that
wealth within each level is concentrated at the midpoint, we can show that redistribution is
constrained by
(PU,o − PU,n)(w − w∗) > (PL,o − PL,n)w∗∗,
where the subscripts o and n refer to the old and new distributions.27 The aim is to decrease
the measure of the L and U agents and increase the measure of M agents. Beyond this we
c a nb ea g n o s t i ca b o u tt h ee x a c tﬂow of wealth across agents. The above expression evaluated
at equality indicates the maximum amount of redistribution possible. When it is a strict
inequality, the right hand side can be used to evaluate the actual amount of redistribution
that occurs.
Consider the initial Tanzanian distribution discussed above. The smallest perturba-
tion we could ﬁnd that would get the economy on to a path of prosperity is pL =0 .5962,
pM =0 .1378, and pU =0 .2693. This increase in the measure of M−agents by 3.2 percentage
points involves a redistribution of 3.9% of the initial wealth. What is the maximum redistri-
bution possible on to a path to prosperity? It is pL =0 .4688,p M =0 .3349, and pU =0 .1964,
amounting to an increase of M−agents by 22.9 percentage points. This involves a redistrib-
ution of 27.9% of initial wealth.28 This much larger redistribution would shave the transition
time to the high steady state by more than a generation.
3.5 Discussion
We had to make a few simplifying assumptions to calibrate the BN model. While the parame-
ter values used do not match exactly with their empirical counterparts, they are in the same
ballpark. The multiple steady state example obtains for a constrained set of parameters.
Despite these limitations, and the delicate dynamics and initial conditions, it is remark-
able that the calibrated model has the potential to explain how two economies identical in
all respects except their initial distributions, could have ended up at very diﬀerent steady
27This expression is derived by stipulating that the aggregate wealth, pL (w




∗∗ + w)/2, at the new distribution does not exceed that of the old.
28This experiment involves computing multiple transition paths and choosing one close enough to the
original initial condition that leads to the high steady state. We cannot rule out the high degree of sensitivity
to initial conditions as the reason for the small magnitude of the minimum required redistribtuion. The
maximum redistribution point presented is further along the path, closer to the steady state.
19states. The policy conclusion that a one time redistribution of wealth can alter the path of
development ﬁnds empirical support in the land reforms of China in the early 80s, which
some associate with the subsequent Chinese economic development.29 The experiments also
indicate a trade-oﬀ between the amount of redistribution — which is, in turn, connected to
political feasibility — and transition times.
4 Human Capital Accumulation
We calibrate a simple heterogeneous-agent, two-period overlapping generations model of ed-
ucation acquisition that exhibits stagnation when the cost of education is high relative to
income.30 The model is in the spirit of Galor and Zeira (1993) in that it features indivisibility
of education and ﬁxed costs. However, unlike their model, enrollment does not automati-
cally imply success in our model; it is probabilistic and depends on ability. Besides being
empirically relevant, this leads to the implication that redistribution even among the poor is
capable of prying the economy out of stagnation. The Galor and Zeira (1993) setup allows
one to think of redistribution from the rich to the poor, but this channel is inoperative at
a stagnant steady state.31 Caucutt and Kumar (2004) provides a detailed theoretical and
quantitative exposition of diﬀerent education policies. We provide a synopsis here and focus
only on a tax-and-subsidy policy and foreign aid.
4.1 Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of two-period lived agents, each generation of
measure one, in an overlapping generations setup. Children diﬀer in their ability to become
educated; more generally, this captures the “functionality” of a family. Conditional on being
enrolled, a child with ability a completes education with probability π (a); with probability
(1 − π (a)), the child drops out and becomes an uneducated worker. The probability function
satisﬁes: π(0) = 0, 0 <π (a) 6 1, ∀ a ∈ (0,1],π
0
(a) > 0, ∀ a ∈ [0,1]. The function π can be
used to capture the quality of the educational system. The distribution function for ability
on the support [0,1] is denoted by F (·),a n df (·) is the corresponding density function.
Ability draws are iid.
29See the volume Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives (Special edition), 2003, published by
the FAO and the World Bank for experiences and perspectives of land reform and its eﬀect on growth and
poverty reduction in several countries.
30The model here extends the one in Caucutt and Kumar (2003) by modeling indirect costs explicitly, and
focusing on conditions that give rise to stagnation.
31An external shock can shift the transition function in their paper and also in the representative agent
setup of Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), who additionally consider fertility decisions. We instead devise
policy measures that would shift the transition function upward.
20Enrolling a child involves a real cost of ed units of consumption. A parent cannot borrow
to ﬁnance her child’s education. If a child is not enrolled she can work and add wc to the
family’s consumption, by performing tasks such as tending livestock, fetching water, and
helping in the ﬁelds, in addition to supplying labor outside the family. If the child is enrolled
in school, she can contribute only ϕwc to the family, where 0 <ϕ<1. The total cost is
e = ed +( 1− ϕ)wc, the sum of direct and indirect costs. If education costs are subsidized
to the level s, it is netted out of the cost e.
The aggregate state variable in this economy is the measure of educated workers entering
t h el a b o rf o r c ea ta n yp e r i o d ,ne. The wage earnings of an educated parent as a function of
the aggregate state is denoted by We (ne), and that of an uneducated parent by Wu (ne).T h e
earnings of a household that does not enroll its child is wj(ne) ≡ Wj (ne)+wc,(j = e,u),
and one that does is wj(ne)−e. Workers inelastically supply their unitary time endowment.
There is a single consumption good produced using educated and uneducated labor as
inputs. The CES production function is Y = A[θ(Ne + γNu)
ν +( 1− θ)(Nu + εNe)ν]
1
ν ,
where 0 <γ ,ε ,ν<1, and γ<ε .32 The ﬁrst term within the square brackets can be
thought of as “brain” and the second term as “brawn”. Here, Ne is the number of educated
workers, and Nu the uneducated workers, employed by the ﬁrm. Educated workers are the
primary suppliers of “brain”. The weight of uneducated workers in this factor, γ,i ss m a l la n d
keeps wages bounded even when the economy is stagnant. The mere hiring of a particular
type of worker contributes to both factors in the proportion shown above. In a competitive
labor market, the wage rates We and Wu would be the appropriate marginal products and
decreasing in Ne and Nu respectively.
A parent of a given type, who has a child of ability a, optimally decides between enrolling
and not enrolling the child, weighing the utility cost of education against the possibility the
child becomes educated and gets higher utility. The intergenerational discount (altruism)
factor is β. The future aggregate state is posited to follow n
0
e = Φ(ne),w h i c hw i l lb e
consistent with the outcome of a perfect foresight equilibrium.
This model delivers a threshold ability for enrollment; parent type j enrolls her child
if a > a∗
j (ne), and does not otherwise. If a∗
j(ne)=1 , even the most able child will not








Enrollment rates are higher among the rich; a∗
e (ne) <a ∗
u (ne),f o rne ∈ [0,1].
A steady state satisﬁes Φ(n∗
e)=n∗
e, with stagnation deﬁned as a locally stable steady
state at n∗
e =0 . Caucutt and Kumar (2004) show that a necessary condition for stagnation is
a∗
u (0) = 1 (the poor do not enroll their children). This condition is suﬃc i e n ti fi ta d d i t i o n a l l y
holds in a neighborhood of ne =0 . When the initial fraction of educated people in the
workforce is too low, the wages of the uneducated workers are too low for them to ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to send their children to school. This results in a decrease in the fraction of
32Stokey (1996) considers a similar production function.
21educated workers next period, which further decreases the wages of the uneducated workers
and reinforces the above-mentioned behavior. The dynamic behavior of the economy around
the origin is therefore mainly governed by the utility cost of poor parents. Provided e is not
prohibitively high, rich parents always enroll a positive fraction of their children, especially
near the origin when their wages are very high. But there is vanishingly small measure of
them.
What conditions yield a∗
u =1in the neighborhood of the origin and hence stagnation?
For a general utility function, a suﬃcient condition is









[u(we (0) − e) − u(wu (0) − e)].
T h el e f th a n ds i d ei st h eutility cost of education to the poor parent. When this is greater
than the discounted, maximum possible utility gain from education, stagnation results. The
discount factor reﬂects diﬀerential enrollment rates. With an isoelastic utility function
u(c)=c1−σ/(1 − σ),σ> 0, it can be shown that the condition for stagnation is more
likely to be satisﬁed when the curvature of the utility function and cost of education are
high, and the wage gap and the discount factor are low.
Similar to the models considered in the previous two sections, ours is capable of delivering
an additional stable steady state with a positive fraction of educated agents. This happens if
the rate of enrollment of the uneducated increases rapidly when ne increases (wu increases).
Whether an economy ends up at the low or high steady state would then depend on the
starting level of ne.
4.2 Calibration
We assume that all children are born with two years of education (“uneducated”) and suc-
cessful education involves completion of a further eight years of schooling (“educated” agents
thus have ten years of education). For eighteen of the worst-performing sSA countries, we
use the data in Barro and Lee (1996) to ﬁnd that median years of primary attainment is
about 1.5 years; this motivates our baseline level of education.33 Secondary schooling indi-
cators are often used in cross-country growth studies and completion of education at this
level is considered the minimum level needed for a worker to perform well in the modern
economy; this motivates our deﬁnition of educated workers. The median years of secondary
attainment in the above-mentioned sample of sSA countries is 0.15, which conforms to our
view of stagnation. We assume agents are born at age 6 and are young until the age of 25;
they become adults at the age of 26, have a child, and die at the age of 45. The model
33The countries we consider are Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,
Djibouti, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, and
Uganda.
22period is thus 20 years. The life-span corresponds closely to the median life expectancy of
45.5 years in this sample.
Table 3: Predetermined Parameters for the Caucutt-Kumar Model
Parameter Value Comment
β 0.6676 Annual discount factor of 0.98 compounded over 20 years
ν 0.35 Educated-uneducated elasticity of substitution of 1.54; Autor et al. (1998)
ε 0.1 Skilled labor counts 10% of unskilled labor towards “brawn”
σ 3.5 Utility RRA parameter; refer Ogaki and Zhang (2001)
F(a) a Uniform ability distribution
We start by assuming values for certain parameters that are commonly used in the
literature. The generational discount factor is set at β =0 .6676, which corresponds to a
yearly discount factor of 0.98 compounded over 20 years. We set ν =0 .35, which corresponds
to an elasticity of substitution between educated and uneducated labor of 1.54. Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998) report that the emerging consensus on the elasticity between skilled and
unskilled labor is approximately 1.4 to 1.5. In the absence of direct evidence, we set ε =0 .1,
(each unit of skilled labor counts 10% of unskilled labor toward brawn) and leave γ<ε
as a free parameter. We appeal to arguments for a negative relationship between relative
risk aversion and wealth (see, for instance, Ogaki and Zhang (2001)), and set the curvature
parameters of the utility function, σ, at a higher value of 3.5 instead of the 2 usually assumed
in calibrated macroeconomic models. We assume a uniform ability distribution in [0,1]; that
is, F (a)=a. The predetermined (“structural”) parameters we use are summarized in Table
3.
We allow for the possibility that the human capital production functions can diﬀer across
the two types of families, to account for the advantages educated families might have in the
production of human capital. The parametric form we use is πi(a)=ki
¡
4a3¢
, in the interval
[0,1/2] and ki
³
1 − 4(1− a)
3
´
in [1/2,1]. This convex-concave parametric form was chosen
because it allows us to better match the enrollment and dropout rates in the vicinity of
stagnation. Such a shape is not required to obtain a stagnant steady state. We set ke =1
and allow only ku to vary. Therefore, the production parameters, A, θ, and γ, education
parameters ed, s, wc,ϕ ,and the human capital production parameter ku need to be chosen.
Since high costs for low quality education and a low wage gap are responsible for stagnation
in our model, we choose these remaining parameters to speciﬁcally match the following sSA
targets. We again use data from wherever it is available, and specify ranges where necessary.
1. Education attainment: We target an attainment, n∗
e, of zero. Calibrating the model
to a steady state attainment close to zero instead of exactly zero will not alter the policy
conclusions signiﬁcantly.
2. Skill premium: Bils and Klenow (2000) present Mincer regression coeﬃcients on schooling
for a few sSA countries: 0.207 for Cote d’Ivoire, 0.126 for Botswana, and 0.067 for Tanzania.
23Given the use of log wages and 8 years of schooling, we compute the corresponding premia
to be 5.24, 2.74, and 1.71 respectively. When the ﬁgures reported in Bigsten et. al. (2000)
are used to compute the premium for our education deﬁnition, we obtain a value of 1.42.34
The premium therefore spans the rather wide range of 1.42 to 5.24.
3. Enrollment rates: A “naive” measure of enrollment rate, obtained by taking a simple
average of the primary and secondary enrollment rates and averaging it across our subsample
of countries, is 31.8%. In the model, education begins at the third year and continues for eight
years. Using year-to-year survival rates from the World Education Indicators, we calculate
enrollment rates conditional on surviving the ﬁrst two years of education; the average of this
enrollment rate is 22.9%.
4. Dropout rates: The “naive” dropout rate is 32.3% for the sample of countries, and the
dropout rate conditional on surviving the ﬁrst two years of education is 13.5%. This dropout
rate is likely to be underestimated, since data is missing for several of the poorest countries.
5. Education subsidy as a fraction of parental cost: Ablo and Reinikka (1998), in Table 5,
present data on parental and government spending in Uganda for 1991 through 1995. In
conjunction with the per capita GNP ﬁgures, we compute the annual share of income that is
spent on education and the parental share of this cost, averaged over 1991-95. If we denote
per capita income by y, then λ1 ≡ total direct cost/y =8 .1%,λ 2 ≡ govt. cost/y =2 .7%,
and therefore λ1 − λ2 = parent0sc o s t / y=5 .4%. This implies the ratio of subsidy to direct
cost of education is s/ed =1 /3.
6. Indirect cost: Bredie and Beeharry (1998), in Annex A, present time use data of school-
aged children in Madagascar and conclude that the opportunity cost for boys in school is 20
hours per week. This ﬁgure is in line with the 21 hours per week reported by Beegle, Dehejia,
and Gatti (2002) for Tanzania. We assume this is half the adult work week; non-schoolgoing
children work half an adult week and schoolgoing children work none. We impute the average
wage in the economy to this time; we set wc =0 .5y,w h e r ey is the average wage earnings
(wu in a stagnant economy).
7. Education expenditure to GDP: Consider family income when the child is not enrolled.
The present value of the parent’s annual income y over 20 years at an 8% annual rate of
discounting is 10.6y. The present value of the child’s income is half this at 5.3y. If the family
enrolls the child, the present value of the annual parental cost of education (λ1 − λ2)y over
the eight schooling years is 6.2(λ1 − λ2)y. If the child goes to school, it is assumed that after
the ﬁrst 8 years, the child can work the rest of his youth years with annual earnings of 0.5y;
the increased earnings due to education are not realized until adulthood.35 The present value
34We use their coeﬃcients from regression (3) in Table 7 to compute wages for 2 and 8 years of education.
35With this assumption, we attempt to account for the experience premium, which we have not explicitly
modeled.
24of these earnings is 2.2y. Therefore, ϕ, the ratio of the earnings of the schoolgoing child to the
non-schoolgoing child is 2.2/5.3=0 .415. We also calculate the direct education expenditure
net of government subsidies as a fraction of GDP as (ed − s)/Y =6 .2(λ1 − λ2)y/10.6y =
0.0316.
Table 4: sSA-speciﬁc Parameters for the Caucutt-Kumar Model
Parameter Value Comment
A 2 TFP; consistent with stagnation (n∗
e =0 )
θ 0.48 Skill share in production; θ and γ pinned down by skill premium
γ 0.05 Unskilled labor counts 5% of skilled labor towards “brain”; θ and γ pinned down by skill premium
ku 0.85 Human capital production parameter for poor; governed by enrollment and dropout rates
ed 0.0326 Direct cost of education; from direct education costs borne by families as a fraction of GDP
s 0.0109 Subsidy; from fraction of education costs subsidized in Ablo and Reinikka (1998)
wc 0.3439 Child’s wage; governed by indirect cost of education in Bredie and Beeharry (1998)
ϕ 0.415 Earnings ratio of schoolgoing to non-schoolgoing child; calculated from Ablo and Reinikka (1998)
In Table 4, we present values for the speciﬁc parameters resulting from our calibration
attempt to best match the above targets. Given that we ﬁxed ε =0 .1, it is reassuring that
a γ =0 .05 <εresults from our calibration; a unit of unskilled of labor contributes less to
“brain” than does a unit of skilled labor to “brawn”. Likewise, given that we set ke =1 , it is
reassuring that ku =0 .85; the human capital production function for families with educated
parents dominates the one for families with uneducated parents. Finally, the resulting value
for the total cost of education, e (= ed +( 1− ϕ)wc), is 0.234; in other words, the direct cost
is only 14% of the total costs.
4.3 What the Calibrated Model Explains
With the chosen parameters, stagnation results (n∗
e =0 ). The skill premium is 4.96,w h i c h
is within the range seen in data, though close to the upper end. Exactly at the point of
stagnation, there is no enrollment; a∗
u =1 , and even though a∗
e =0 .12 < 1, there is a zero
measure of educated people. Therefore, we examine the average dropout and enrollment
rates in the “vicinity” of stagnation (ne =0 .00 − 0.15), with the interpretation that these
economies are headed toward stagnation if they are not already in it. The enrollment rate is
in the range of 0 to 21%, which is a bit lower than the range given in the previous subsection,
but in the ballpark of the enrollment rate calculated conditional on students surviving past
the second year; the dropout rate is in the range of 24 to 43%, overlapping considerably with
the range seen in data.
Even though multiple steady states are theoretically possible, for the chosen calibration
the transition function yields stagnation as the only steady state.36 An increase in β and a
36Since this is our own model, we take the liberty of not searching for a set of parameters that yields
25decrease in σ results in a non-zero steady state. Our assumption that a higher wage from
education does not materialize until the second period has implications for the value of the
indirect cost. A higher value for ϕ decreases the opportunity cost of education and makes
stagnancy less likely. We search for the minimum value of ϕ that would get the economy
out of stagnation; it is 0.44 as opposed to the baseline value of 0.415.
4.4 Policy Experiments
Given the single stagnant steady state that we obtain, we only study continuous policies
to revive these economies, rather than one-shot policies to change the initial measure of
educated. Since the behavior of the uneducated poor, who form the vast majority, leads to
stagnation, it is natural to consider a policy of subsidizing their direct, and possibly indirect,
costs of education.37 We assume all students, rich or poor, get a subsidy of s each, and all
workers are taxed at the rate τ. The government balances its budget every period. We hold
the subsidy, s, constant at the level that leads to the target steady state. The tax rate τ
is varied each period so as to balance the government budget. In all experiments, we hold
the π functions at their benchmark speciﬁcation; we do not make any adjustment for the
quality of the education system. We do not have enough data on quality, especially from
this region, to calibrate changes in π. We also expect the quality of educational institutions
to move upward more sluggishly than enrollment.
We use Mauritius, as we did in Sections 2 and 3, as an example of a high-performing sSA
economy. Barro and Lee (1996) indicate that the percentage of population who attended sec-
ondary school in Mauritius was 36.5% in 1990 and the percentage who completed secondary
school was 28.1%. While the average primary expenditure per pupil for our sub-sample de-
creased from $135.6 in 1960 to $79.8 in 1990, it increased in Mauritius from $256 in 1960 to
as high as $544 in 1980. The public education expenditure as a fraction of GDP was higher
for Mauritius in 1990 at 3.6% when compared to the average of 2.8% for the rest (which is
inﬂated by low GDP levels). In 1980, nearly 20% of government expenditures in Mauritius
went to fund education. Given these facts one could plausibly argue that education policies
were at least partly responsible for its solid economic performance. Moreover, the primary
enrollment rate was close to 100% in 1960, a decade before the economy started growing,
when its expenditure per pupil was nearly twice as high as the other sSA countries. These
facts allay concerns that education might have followed rather than preceded development;
indeed it has been argued that the export-oriented industries, mentioned in Section 2, were
multiplicity.
The framework is rich enough to accommodate developed countries such as the US, since higher education
expenditures, higher TFP, and better quality education systems are associated with higher steady states. We
do not pursue this route here.
37Mexico’s Progresa program, for instance, subsidizes both the direct and indirect costs.
26attracted to Mauritius because of its better educated workforce.38 We therefore analyze
policies for the other sSA countries that would result in a steady state close to the 30%
level of educational attainment seen in Mauritius. Since our calibration indicates that at the
prevailing subsidy level, the net educational cost is still too high to escape stagnation, our
aim is to ﬁnd a subsidy level that would shift the transition function upward and cause the
economy to not only emerge from stagnation, but also result in a n∗
e =0 .3.
A subsidy level of 0.09, which is 38.5% of total costs, is needed to take the economy to
a steady state of n∗
e =0 .3. It is not enough for the government to subsidize only the direct
costs of education; it would have to defray part of the child’s contribution to the family
income that is lost by sending the child to school. At the steady state, a tax rate of 3.2%
needs to be levied on all workers to meet the cost of subsidies.39 Since all workers are taxed
at the same rate, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP will also be 3.2%. This is
close to the 3.6% ﬁgure cited earlier for Mauritius and thus appears to be an achievable
target. The closeness of the model outcome to data from a country that was not originally
part of the calibration, lends support to the validity of the calibrated model and the use of
education subsidies as a development policy. The expenditure to GDP of 3.2% can be put
in perspective by considering the military expenditure as a fraction of GNP, which was 3.1%
in sSA in 1992. Evidently, diverting part of these expenditures to education will go a long
way toward meeting subsidy expenses before new taxes become necessary.40
E a c ha g e n tw o u l dh a v et ob eg i v e n20.3% more consumption every period in the stagnant
state, in order to equate an aggregate welfare measure — weighting generations within a
period equally and using a discount factor of β for future generations — to that in the new
steady state. When the costs of transition (increased taxes and educational investment when
uneducated workers’ wages are still low) is taken into account, the gain in welfare in terms
of equivalent consumption of 6.6% is much lower, but still signiﬁcant. The economy is very
close to the steady state in four to ﬁve model periods. A tax rate of 7% maximizes welfare,
inclusive of transition, and results in a steady state education attainment of 38%.
38See, for instance, Anker et. al. (2001) and also Lamusse (1995),who attributes the success of the
export processing zones to “a reserve labor force of literate women who were readily trainable for semi-skilled
production jobs...”
39This policy increases output by close to 50%. The ratio of the subsidy to per capita GDP is 8.75%.
The skill premium drops considerably, to 1.54. Given the skill premium of 2.1 in Malaysia, a country of
comparable educational and economic development, calculated from Bils and Klenow (2000), the drop in
premium appears to be overstated. The economywide enrollment rate is 36.2%, which masks the relatively
high enrollment of 61% for educated parents. The dropout rate is close to 20%.
40See 2000 World Development Indicators, Table 5.7, for military expenditure data.
274.5 Discussion
The redistribution motive in our setup arises from the indivisibility of education, liquidity
constraints, and the focus on aggregate welfare. If the return to education falls a bit short of
the amount required for enrollment for every student, aggregate welfare could be improved
by redistributing and making the return attractive at least for the most able students. At
the stagnant steady state everyone is poor, and it is redistribution across ability rather than
income levels that gives the initial kick-start to the economy. It is important to note that the
child’s ability need not be observed by anyone other than the parent; the in-kind nature of
the subsidy would automatically attract the more able students. This implicit, rather than
explicit, redistribution across abilities makes such a scheme politically feasible.
Unlike the models considered in Section 5, ours is not a model of political economy.
However, anticipating the eﬀects studied in those models, we speculate on the question of
why such subsidy schemes might not be seen in practice. There is a drop in wages of the
educated of about 61% going from stagnation to the Mauritius-like subsidy level. In the
neighborhood of stagnancy, we ﬁnd that these workers actually prefer stagnancy. Across all
steady state comparisons, the currently uneducated prefer subsidies more than the currently
educated.41 There is therefore an incentive for the educated “elite”, who often occupy
key policy making positions in these countries, to not subsidize education and preserve the
monopoly they enjoy for their children who are more likely to be educated. If this incentive
eﬀectively causes subsidization to be blocked, the economy will remain stagnant.
The tax-and-subsidy experiment suggests that even an economy locked into stagnation
need not be dependent on foreign aid to trigger development. When we do conduct an
experiment that mimics foreign aid, with foreign aid paying for subsidies instead of local
taxes, welfare is obviously higher. But it appears inconceivable that countries will be willing
to donate the foreign aid of 6.8% of GDP (10.4% relative to pre-subsidy levels) that is needed
to take the economy to the same educational attainment as under optimal taxation, year
after year. An intermediate strategy would be for the government to borrow, if possible, on a
long-term basis from other countries or development agencies to ﬁnance increased education
expenditures and alleviate transitional costs.
5 Political Economy
We consider two models, which follow quite diﬀerent approaches, in this category. Bour-
guignon and Verdier (2000) assume that only an educated-wealthy minority (oligarchy) ini-
tially participates in the political system. An education externality provides the oligarchs an
incentive to subsidize the education of the poor. However, this is tempered by the concern
41Even the poor who do not enroll their children will support the tax and subsidy scheme. Even though
the unenrolled child will be poor next period, the wage of the uneducated increases.
28that the newly educated poor may gain political control, and impose costly redistributive
taxes.
In Acemoglu and Robinson (2002), a ruler who is assured of his position does not block
technology adoption because he reaps a percentage of the increased output. But if the prob-
ability of getting replaced increases with adoption, he may choose to block the technological
advance in order to remain in power. Rulers with a very ﬁrm grip on power, as well as those
with a high probability of being replaced, choose to innovate, while those in the middle
choose to block technology adoption.
5.1 The Politics of Education
5.1.1 Model
In the Bourguignon and Verdier (BV) model, an individual lives for two periods, young
and adult. Young agents diﬀer in the innate human capital they inherit directly from their
parents. Initially there are two types of young agents, those with educated (rich) parents and
those with uneducated (poor) parents. Their earnings are given by, yi + µ(1 − p),i = p,r,
where yi is the inherited human capital, 1 − p is the fraction of young whose parents were
educated, and µ is the intensity of the education externality.
A young person decides whether or not to get educated, given a cost of c in the current
period, and an increase in next period’s income of R. A young agent who chooses education
consumes yi + µ(1 − p) − c, while young, and yi + µ(1 − p + e)+R, while old. Here, e, is
the fraction of “newly educated” young — those with uneducated parents who choose to get
educated. If the agent chooses no education, he consumes yi + µ(1 − p) while young, and
yi + µ(1 − p + e),w h i l eo l d . With linear utility and no discounting across periods, the
condition for choosing education is, c<R . BV assume that there is no borrowing, and that
R>c>y p + µ(1 − p). Therefore, the young with educated parents can aﬀord education,
and others cannot.
While young, rich children decide whether to subsidize the education costs for a measure
e of poor children. Doing so would increase every adult’s income by µe. All educated
adults vote over a proportional tax rate that is redistributed in a lump sum fashion. Since
newly educated adults have a lower income, these new members of the oligarchy may favor
redistribution. The upper bound on redistributive taxes that can be levied on each rich
agent is assumed to be τ+.
The authors’ dynamic framework yields one of three outcomes; here, democratization is
equivalent to the education of the poor.
(1) The economy never democratizes, and the measure of the oligarchy remains at the initial
(1 − p) forever. This is a trap. For this to occur the externality must be low relative to the
cost of education: µ<(c − yp)/(2(1 − p)).
(2) The economy democratizes fully in two generations. This occurs for intermediate values
29of the externality, µ. There are two further possibilities. (a) If the initial inequality is high
enough, the oligarchy chooses to educate only e =( 1−p) of the poor in the ﬁrst generation,
so that the oligarchy does not lose its voting advantage. In the second generation there are
2(1−p) educated, and the poor now get enough of a boost from the education externality that
they are no longer credit constrained. Everyone is educated in all future generations.42 (b) If
the initial inequality is low enough, the oligarchy chooses to educate e>1−p poor in the ﬁrst
generation. In the ﬁrst generation, the oligarchy does lose its voting advantage; however, the
chosen redistribution is zero. In the second generation, there are enough educated agents,
and the poor get enough of a boost from the education externality that they are no longer
credit constrained. Again, everyone is educated in all future generations.
(3) The economy democratizes fully in one generation. If the externality is high enough
relative to the initial inequality, the oligarchy chooses to educate all of the poor in the ﬁrst
generation. Everyone is educated in all future generations.
The parameters of the model need to satisfy a few constraints. The education externality,
µ, and the earnings yp+µ(1−p) and yr+µ(1−p) must be positive. The return to education
must be greater than its cost, so that at least the rich children would attend school. The
cost of becoming educated must be greater than the poor’s earnings, c>y p + µ(1 − p), for
education subsidies to be relevant.
For analytical tractability, BV assume linear preferences; the poor children do not attend
school only because the cost is strictly greater than their income. From the human capital
model studied in Section 4, we ﬁnd that the concavity of preferences plays a big role in ed-
ucation decisions. While assuming concave utility makes the model analytically intractable,
we can perform numerical exercises using calibrated parameters. Therefore, we also consider
a lifetime concave utility speciﬁcation with discounting of, log(c1)+β log(c2).
With concave utility, the young person equates the marginal utilities of consumption
while young and old, and the subsidy required is higher than just the diﬀerence between
cost and income. The subsidy is also increasing in the fraction of newly educated people,
e. For a poor person deciding on schooling, an increase in e implies an increase in his adult
income and a decrease in his marginal utility of consumption. A commensurate increase in
consumption while young is needed to equate marginal utilities. Therefore, a larger subsidy is
needed to induce enrollment. With linear utility, the education externality can boost future
income of the poor enough to ease the liquidity constraint. With curvature, the externality
can initially work against the subsidy, causing fewer agents to get educated in the ﬁrst place.
There is another eﬀect that could decrease subsidization by the oligarchs. Since they are
relatively richer in their adult period, they are even less willing to pay a cost while young to
reap a beneﬁtw h e no l d ,a ne ﬀe c tt h a ti sm a g n i ﬁed by discounting.
42The conditions for this and other remaining cases are algebraically involved and can be found in the
paper.
305.1.2 Calibration
We remain as close to the spirit of the model as possible while calibrating this repeated-two-
period model. This is not necessarily an overlapping-generations model, since generations
do not interact aside from transmitting human capital “genetically”. Therefore, the two
periods need not be of the same length; the period an agent is young need only be as long
as it takes to acquire education. With linear preferences, we follow the authors and do not
discount within or across periods, but we do so with concave preferences. This makes the
mapping of yearly data, which we do at the beginning of the next subsection, into the youth
and adult periods straightforward. Because the economy starts with only the rich being
educated, 1 − p = e, initially. The parameters we need to calibrate are 1 − p, yp,y r,R ,µ
and c. Here, µ is treated as “structural”, and the income distribution and cost parameters
are necessarily chosen to target an sSA country, Tanzania in this instance.43
In Tanzania, 9.6% of the population completed primary school in 1990, where primary
school is of a 7-year duration. Therefore, we set the fraction educated, 1 − p to 0.1 and s,
the number of years of schooling to 7.
Given the average adult income, AI, and the percentage of income earned by the uned-
ucated, G, we write two conditions that simultaneously yield yp(µ) and yr(µ,R):
AI =( 1 − p)(yr + µ(1 − p)+R)+p(yp + µ(1 − p))
G = p(yp + µ(1 − p))/AI.
From the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), we use the per capita Gross
National Income (GNI) for AI. For Tanzania, in 1993, AI =$ 1 7 0 .W es e tG =0 .699, the
fraction of income earned by the poorest 90% in Tanzania in 1993, as reported by WDI. The
above two equations then imply yp(µ) = 132.03 − 0.1µ, and yr(µ,R) = 511.70 − R − 0.1µ.
We select µ using estimates of the percentage increase in average log earnings due to












Since there is a diﬀerence between the average population getting one more year of schooling
(in empirical estimates) and one person getting s years more of education (in the model),
we make the distinction between (1−p)data and (1−p). Noting this, and the expression for
AI, we simplify the above equality to
D =





Substituting in for yp(µ), yr(µ,R), AI,a n ds yields µ = 1190D − 379.67.
43The cost and income parameters were speciﬁc to the sSA economies in the human capital model as well.
31Heckman and Klenow (1997) report that in log per capita GDP regressions, the coeﬃcient
on average years of schooling attained in the population age 15 and above, is 0.3.W h e n
the authors control for technology, the estimate drops to 10.6% in 1985 and 7.0% in 1960.
Venniker (2000) surveys the literature to ﬁnd there is no conclusive evidence in favor of,
or against, education externalities. An estimate of D = .3 implies a negative µ,w h i c ht h e
model does not permit. Therefore, we use D =0 .35, which is slightly higher than the
highest empirical estimate seen.44 This implies µ = $36.83, and therefore, yp = $128.35 and
yr(R) = 508.02 − R.
We compute the model R using Mincer coeﬃcients. Given earnings of an uneducated
rich child of yr+µ(1−p), earnings of an educated child of yr+µ(1−p)+R, a n da ne s t i m a t e
of the gross percentage increase in earnings from getting 7 more years of education, Rdata,
we can write, (yr +µ(1−p))Rdata =( yr +µ(1−p)+R). Hall and Jones (1999) use a return
o f1 3 . 4 %f r o mt h eﬁrst four years of education, 10.1% from the next four, and 6.8% from the
next two. With s =7 , Rdata =2 .2071,a n dR = $279.86. Therefore, yr = $228.16.45
As in Section 4, we assume that indirect costs are half of the earnings of a poor (une-
ducated) person. Penrose (1998) reports direct costs of education in Tanzania. The gov-
ernment spending per primary pupil in 1994/1995 was $20.51. The maximum reported
spending by households on a primary pupil in 1994 was $79.90, while two-thirds reported
spending between $8.28 and $31.05.46 Therefore, an upper bound on total cost is c1 =
$20.51 + $79.90 + .5(yp + µ(1 − p)) = $166.43. Using the upper end of the range in which
two-thirds of the respondents fall, c2 = $20.51 + $31.05 + .5(yp + µ(1 − p)) = $117.58. We
summarize the parameters we use in Table 5.
Table 5: Parameters for the Bourguignon-Verdier Model
Parameter Value Comment
µ $36.83 Externality parameter; compare with Heckman and Klenow (1997)
1 − p 0.1 Fraction of population completing primary school; Tanzania 1990
yp $128.35 Earnings of poor; from WDI data on per capita income and poorest 90% income
yr $228.16 Earnings from rich; from WDI data on per capita income and poorest 90% income
R $279.86 Monetary gain from education; from Mincer returns in Hall and Jones (1999)
c $117.58, $166.43 Lower and upper bounds on cost of education; Penrose (1998)
44Other estimates for education externality are even lower. Rauch (1993), without correcting for the
endogeneity, ﬁnds that a one year increase in average education raises wages by 3 to 5 percent in 1980.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) use child labor laws and compulsory schooling laws as instruments for average
schooling, and ﬁnd external returns to education of around 1p e r c e n tt h a ta r en o ts t a t i s t i c a l l ys i g n i ﬁcant.
45Bils and Klenow’s (2000) Mincer coeﬃcient for Tanzania is 6.7% per year. The implied Rdata =1 .5745,
and R =$ 1 8 6 .71, are in the ballpark of the estimates implied by Hall and Jones (1999).
46A 1994 exchange rate of .00207 $/Schillings from the WDI is used in these calculations.
325.1.3 What the Calibrated Model Explains
The values in Table 5 imply that the poor young and poor adults earn yp + µ(1 − p)=
$132.03. The earnings of the young rich are yr + µ(1 − p) = $231.84, and the adult rich
are yr + µ(1 − p)+R = $511.70. The education “premium” is 3.88, which lies in the range
of the estimates reported in Section 4. We map the yearly data into values for the young
period and the adult period. We assume agents are young for 7 years and old for 33 years.
This implies that, with linear preferences, earnings of the young and poor are $924.01, young
and rich $1622.88, adult and poor $4356.99, and adult and rich $16,886.10. The increase in
earnings from schooling is $9235.38, the education externality is $1215.39, and the cost of
education is either c1 = $1165.01 or c2 = $823.06. With linear preferences, the second cost
estimate is too low; even the poor young can aﬀord education. Therefore we use the ﬁrst
cost estimate. The increase in earnings due to education is greater than both of our cost
estimates. The condition for a trap holds since, µ = $1215.39 < (c − yp)/2e = $1332.80. So,
without further intervention, this economy will remain with 10% of the population educated
forever. A subsidy of $241 is needed to cover the diﬀerence between costs and the income of
the poor.
When preferences are concave, we discount across periods and across years within a
period. We use an annual β =0 .98. This means that we need to recompute the values for
earnings, costs, and returns. We ﬁnd that earnings when young and poor are $870.57, young
and rich $1528.69, adult and poor $3212.25, and adult and rich $12,449.52. The increase in
earnings from schooling is $6808.92, the education externality is $896.06, and using the lower
estimate of costs, the cost of education is $701.70. With these parameters, the rich optimally
choose to go to school. It turns out that the poor choose not to attend school even though
they can aﬀord to pay the lower of the two cost estimates. The result is stagnation. In order
to get educated, a poor person needs a subsidy of $155.37. This is lower than the $241 ﬁgure
for the linear case because we have assumed the more reasonable lower cost estimate.
5.1.4 Policy Experiments
When preferences are linear, the young rich are willing to pay a subsidy of $121.54 towards
educating 86.4% young poor. This is calculated from the condition for case 2b discussed
earlier, where the young rich choose to educate just enough poor, so that even though they
loose their voting power, the newly educated old vote for zero redistribution. However, this
amount does not cover the required subsidy of $241. If foreign aid makes up the diﬀerence
of $119.26, 86.4% of the young poor will be educated. The contribution by the rich works to
5.68% of their lifetime income. What happens to the poor who do not get educated initially?
In the next generation, the education externality increases everyone’s earnings. Young peo-
ple’s earnings increase by $222.83, but there is still a shortfall of $18.17 to cover costs of
education. However, foreign aid is not required to cover this shortfall. The newly educated
33members of the oligarchy are now in the majority and are not subject to redistribution.
Therefore, they are willing to subsidize the remaining poor. After the second generation
there will forever be three earnings levels, the initially rich, the ﬁrst group of poor to be
educated, and the second group of poor to be educated.
Alternatively the foreign organization could initially pay the entire subsidy for all of the
poor in the ﬁrst generation. If they do so, everyone will remain educated for all future
periods. In this scenario there will forever be two earnings levels, the initially rich, and
the initially poor. As a percentage of GDI in Tanzania, the subsidy costs for the foreign
organization is 8.7% for seven years when it shares costs with the local wealthy elite, and
20.2% for seven years when it bears the entire cost. If the foreign organization can overcome
problems associated with lending resources for education purposes, a lower cost solution
would be to lend to the poor while they are young, and collect from them once they are old
and educated.
With concave preferences, if foreign aid is low (below $150/student), the poor continue
to choose no enrollment, and the rich no subsidization. If foreign aid is $155/student, the
rich choose to send 4.5% to school and are willing to contribute $2.76/student towards the
subsidy, 0.08% of their income. For reasons explained earlier, as the fraction educated rises,
the subsidy required by the poor also rises. If foreign aid is $160/student, the rich choose to
send 9.28% and contribute $0.28/student towards the subsidy, 0.01% of their income. When
foreign aid is greater than this, more students choose to get educated, but the rich do not
contribute to the subsidy. When foreign aid is $200/student, all the remaining poor choose
to get educated. Clearly, these policies are much costlier for a foreign donor than when
utility is linear and there is no discounting, even though the lower of the two cost estimates
is used. Here, the role that the oligarchy is willing to play is much reduced.
5.1.5 Discussion
The policy experiments highlight the need for donors of foreign aid to recognize that the
oligarchy is wary of losing political control. Policies must be designed accordingly before the
oligarchy is willing to share in the costs of education subsidies. For example, if the donor
requires that the oligarchy match the subsidy for all poor children, and not just a fraction,
the policy will fail. The framework also suggests a policy instrument of education lotteries,
to allow the poor to pool income and educate only a subset of themselves. When the gain
from the education externality is realized, the remainder of the uneducated poor may be able
to educate themselves as well. Finally, even though this is not a model of multiple equilibria
with automatic implications for a one-shot policy change, foreign aid is only needed for one
generation when utility is linear.
The role of the oligarchy in sharing the costs with foreign donors is diminished when
preferences are concave and we allow for discounting. The eﬀect of the education externality,
while still an impetus for the rich to subsidize the poor, is weakened. It is also the case
34that, with both linear and concave utility, we need to use an implausibly high value for
the externality parameter in order to match the model’s constraints. Another concern in
this environment is that BV assume that the oligarchy is myopic across generations. They
do not care if they lose power, as long as they are not hit with redistributive taxes in this
generation. The willingness of the oligarchy to subsidize the poor will be weakened, if they
are concerned about holding onto power for future generations as well. Lastly, in this model,
the oligarchy has complete political control, but BV assume that they do not exercise it by
extracting resources from the poor. We next turn to a model that has this feature.
5.2 The Politics of Technology Adoption
5.2.1 Model
The Acemoglu and Robinson (AR) framework consists of a mass of citizens normalized to
measure one, an incumbent ruler, and an inﬁnite supply of potential new rulers. Inﬁnitely
lived agents discount the future by β. Once rulers are replaced they receive no utility. Each
citizen produces yt = At, where At is the technology available at time t.T h e r u l e r t a x e s
output at the rate τ. There is a home production technology that produces (1−τ)At,s ot h a t
the ruler can only extract taxes at the maximum rate τ from the citizenry. A technological
advance increases A by a factor α>1. There is no resource cost to adopting the new
technology. However, there may be a cost of political change. The random cost of replacing
the ruler when he innovates is z0A,a n dzA if he does not. This cost may be positive or
negative; the possibility of a negative draw (a gain) gives citizens an incentive to replace the
ruler.
AR assume that z ∼ U[γµ − 1/2,γµ+1 /2] and z0 ∼,U[µ − 1/2,µ+1 /2],γ≥ 1. The
two key parameters are µ, an inverse measure of the degree of political competition, and γ,
a measure of how much technological innovation erodes incumbency advantage by creating
“turbulence”. It is optimal for a social planner to always innovate. However, in equilibrium,
a ruler will not always innovate if doing so increases the probability that he will be replaced.
As γ increases, it is more likely a ruler will not innovate as this decreases the probability of
his remaining in power. The eﬀect of µ is more complicated. When µ =0(a high degree of
political competition), the distributions of z and z0 are the same, and a ruler always innovates
as γ is now irrelevant. When µ ≥ 1/2, the leader is ﬁrmly entrenched, is in no danger of
losing political power, and therefore innovates.
When µ>0,a n dγ>α , a ruler won’t innovate if 3
2(α − 1)/(γ − α) <µ<1
2. When
γ ≤ α or µ ≤ 0, a ruler will always innovate. This condition is independent of output A,
and therefore constant over time.
In the basic model the only beneﬁt to staying in power is a fraction of the output pro-
duced. In an extension, AR add another source of extractable rent, R,w h i c hi sﬁxed and
independent of the prevailing technology. Income at date t is now given by Ath,w h e r eh
35is an exogenous measure of human capital. Citizens use the same replacement rule as in
the basic model, and so the probabilities of staying in power are the same. But now the
innovation decision is dependent on At. As output grows relative to the ﬁxed rents, the
gain from innovating increases. Once an incumbent starts to innovate, he and all future
rulers will always innovate. A leader will innovate if and only if τAth/R is larger than a
constant that depends only on the model parameters.47 As output grows, this condition will
eventually be met. If a country has a higher stock of human capital, or lower rents available
to a ruler, innovation is more likely. Interestingly, a higher tax rate, relative to rents, makes
innovation more likely, because the ruler gains more from increases in output. Note all inputs
are inelastically supplied, and the increased tax rate has no eﬀect on output.
5.2.2 Calibration
We suppose that the “turbulence” parameter γ is structural, while µ is country speciﬁc.
Consider ﬁrst countries that always innovate, growing approximately at the frontier growth
rate α. While they could be authoritarian or democratic in the model, the countries that
we consider are all democratic. The expected length of oﬃce of a ruler in a democratic,





o nt h et e n u r eo fr u l ei d e n t i ﬁes the µ associated with each democratic, innovating country.
Since these economies are always innovating, it follows from the condition in the previous
subsection that µ ≤ 3
2(α − 1)/(γ − α). We use our collection of frontier countries to pin
down an upper bound for γ, γU. To do this, we can use the average of µ across all countries,
or back out γ from each country using its own µ, and take the upper bound. We can then use
γU to calculate a µL = 3
2(α−1)/(γU − α). This procedure essentially allows us to construct
an interval [µL,1/2] within which there is no innovation unless there is a regime change. If
µ ≤ µL, there is enough political competition and if µ ≥ 1/2 there is enough entrenchment,
and in both cases there will always be innovation.
We next consider countries where rulers never innovate for fear of losing power. However,
an occasional negative cost draw would cause replacement of the ruler, and trigger innovation.
The model yields an expression for this minimal growth rate as, 1+(α−1)(α−γµ−1/2). Given
α, γU,a n dµL, we compute an upper bound on the growth rate that could be rationalized
by the model as occurring in politically trapped countries. This, we then compare with the
growth rates of sSA countries seen in data to see if we can interpret the sSA situation as a
political trap.
We set the average gross annual growth rate of frontier countries, α,t o1.025.U s i n g
their average length of rule we calculate µL =0 .26.48 The procedure outlined above yields
47The exact condition can be found in their paper.
48In frontier countries — Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, It a l y ,N e t h e r l a n d s ,N o r w a y ,S w e -
d e n ,t h eU K ,a n dt h eU S—al e a d e ri si no ﬃce for an average of 4.24 years (post-World War II period).
36γU =1 .17. The annual growth rate has to be less than 0.58% for the model to deliver a no-
innovation regime. If we instead compute γU as the upper bound resulting from individual
country calculations, we get γU =1 .13, and µL =0 .35 for Germany. Here, the annual growth
rate has to be less than 0.33% for the model to deliver a no-innovation regime.
We approach the extended model the same way. However, data on growth rates, tax
rates, and rents are now needed to compute the upper bound, γU, and the upper bound
on the growth rate consistent with a political trap. While the discount rate β is structural,
the rent and tax parameters are country speciﬁc. Rewrite τAth/R, which needs to exceed a
threshold before innovation happens, as τ/(R/Ath), where Ath is the economy’s GDP. We
continue to use an α of 1.025, and assume an annual discount rate β =0 .98.F o rτ,w eu s e
the central government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP for 1990-1995 from the United
Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance. In the model, taxes literally
accrue to the ruler. However, we can use taxes in the data as a proxy for the power a ruler
has, and hence for the model’s τ. This is 30.8% for the frontier countries and 19.2% for the
sSA countries. As a proxy for rents to GDP, we use the percentage of GDP between 1990
and 2002 spent on general administration, also taken from the same data source. Higher
administrative expenses are more likely to encourage corruption and rent-seeking activities,
which motivated our use of this data. For the frontier countries, this measure is 3.9% and for
sSA it is 6.2%. It is the ratio of tax rates to rent share that really matters for the innovation
condition — this is 7.9 for the frontier countries and 3.1 for the sSA countries. The parameters
used are presented in Table 6.
Using the innovating country µL of 0.26 that we calculated earlier, we ﬁnd that γU =
1.1615. Here the annual growth rate has to be less than 0.61% for the model to deliver a
no-innovation regime, remarkably close to the 0.58% found in the basic model.
Table 6: Parameters for the Acemoglu-Robinson Models
Parameter Value Comment
α 1.025 Average gross annual growth rate of frontier countries
γ 1.13 − 1.17 “Turbulence” parameter; consistent with frontier countries innovating
β 0.98 Annual discount rate
µ < 0.26, 0.35 Inverse of political competition; consistent with frontier countries innovating
τ 30.8% Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP for frontier countries, 1990-95; UN data
19.2% Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP for sSA countries, 1990-95; UN data
R/Ah 3.9% % of GDP spent on general administration for frontier countries, 1990-2002; UN data
6.2% % of GDP spent on general administration for sSA countries, 1990-2002; UN data
5.2.3 What the Calibrated Models Explain
Using the basic model, can the parameters based on the frontier, innovating countries deliver
growth rates consistent with the interpretation that sSA is trapped in a political situation
37with little innovation? To answer this, we use the average growth rates for a set of sSA
countries from two diﬀerent sources, WDI and The Penn World Tables (PWT).49 If we use
the 0.58% bound used from the average µ, 9/15 of the countries satisfy the non-innovation
condition when PWT growth rates are used, and 9/11 of the countries satisfy it when the
WDI growth rate is used. When the more stringent 0.33% bound is used, 6/15 PWT countries
and 7/11 WDI countries are consistent with non-innovation. Therefore, even the basic model
is capable of explaining the stagnation in several African countries as arising from a lack of
political competition.
In the extended model, even if a country does nothing, it will eventually grow its way out
of the trap. How long will that take? If a country grows at a rate of 0.54% per year, close
to the average growth rate in sSA, it will take 258 years for the non-innovating condition to
be overturned. This is consistent with stagnation in sSA. If a country here reduces its rents
to those in developed countries, it will take 172 years for it to become an innovator. If it
increases its tax rate to those of developed countries, as well as reduces its rents, it will take
83 years. If it increases its level of democracy to the level of innovating countries, but leaves
its rents and taxes at the original levels, it takes 166 years to innovate. Clearly, there is not
a big return from piecemeal reforms. To get out of the trap, the democracy level and the tax
rate relative to the share of rents would have to be altered simultaneously. This would cause
the innovation condition to hold immediately. We are unable to quantitatively evaluate the
cost of implementing these recommendations in the way we have done for other models.
However, we can return to the sSA country we have been using as a model of development,
Mauritius, for a comparison. Freedom House annually ranks countries on a scale of 1 to 7 on
the dimensions of political rights and civil liberties, with 1 being the best and 7 being the
worst. The frontier countries we examine have an average score of 1.01 for political rights
and 1.25 for civil liberties; that is, they have close to the best ranking. The sSA countries
we examine fare much worse, with scores of 5.83 and 5.57. Mauritius, on the other hand has
much better scores of 1.77 and 2.23. Likewise, its tax and rent measures are 21.2% and 2.7%,
the ratio of which is almost exactly that of the innovating countries. While these facts do
not settle issues regarding causality or the exact mechanism posited by the AR model, they
are consistent with the model’s general premise that the political economy impacts growth.
5.2.4 Discussion
The implied relationship between democracy and growth in this model is not monotonic.
High levels of democracy and authoritarianism are both consistent with frontier growth.
Therefore, as a country that begins with an authoritarian regime becomes more democratic,
49The country list is same as the one in footnote 33, except for Djibouti and Somalia. We use the RGDPCH
variable from The Penn World Tables, for an average growth rate of 0.49%, for data available between 1950
and 2000. Using real per capita GNP (1965-1998) from WDI yields an average of -0.15%.
38it could ﬁrst experience a decline in growth before it sees an increase in growth.50 The
distinction between µ and γ is a useful, and essential feature of the model, but directly pinning
down these parameters is a daunting proposition. We have followed an indirect strategy to
identify these parameters; therefore, our conclusions should be viewed with caution. Finally,
attempting to quantify the costs of altering the degree of democracy is beyond the scope of
our paper. In general, a country can also alter the tax rate, rents, or stock of human capital
in order to speed the transition to innovation. The aim is to provide a ruler with incentives
to innovate. This can obviously be diﬃcult in countries that are undemocratic.
6 A Comparative Evaluation
What conclusions can we draw by considering these models collectively? Consider the ease of
calibration ﬁrst. We have attempted to calibrate models not originally intended for calibra-
tion, which poses challenges. Our model, developed explicitly for calibration, was naturally
easier in this regard. However, even beyond these obvious diﬀerences, the parameters in
the non-political models are primarily technological, and are easier to calibrate than those
in the more recent political models. With variables such as political rents and democratic
turbulence driving explanations for stagnation, there is an element of “theory ahead of mea-
surement” in these models, at the current stage. BV avoid the need for an explicit political
variable by equating education with political power, but abstract from the exact mechanism
by which this happens. But the political models are the most parsimonious, with the fewest
number of parameters to calibrate.
High-quality data is not abundant for the sSA region to which the models are calibrated.
Therefore, data used from this region could be considered less reliable than the developed
country data used to calibrate the “structural” parameters of the Big Push and occupational
choice models. Stagnation in the Big Push model arises from a bad equilibrium selection
and except to validate the policy of investment subsidy by comparing it to the one followed
in Mauritius, we do not need any sSA data. In the occupational choice model, stagnation
arises purely from a bad initial condition, and we need only the income distribution data
for our candidate countries of Tanzania and Mauritius. The human capital model on the
other hand, relies heavily on sSA data to calibrate education costs relative to income and the
skilled-unskilled wage gap. Data from sSA is also needed for the education costs, inequality,
political rents, and other variables in the political economy models. However, greater reliance
on sSA data increases conﬁdence in the model’s ability to explain the particular situation at
hand rather than a generic one.
All the non-political models we consider are capable of generating multiple equilibria. So
50This is reminiscent of the non-monotonic connection between democracy and growth that Barro (1996)
ﬁnds, though he reports democracy and growth are positively related at low levels of democracy (high µ),
and negatively at high levels (low µ).
39it is natural to ask how robustly this happens forr e a l i s t i cp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .I nt h eB i gP u s h
model, multiplicity results for a limited range of high ﬁxed costs of industrialization and a
high degree of increasing returns. The dynamic investment model is most robust if an open
economy assumption is used to sidestep the eﬀect of increased investment on interest rates.
Av e r ys p e c i ﬁc set of parameters is needed in the occupational choice model for multiplicity
to result, given tractability considerations. But in both models, the parameters needed are
not indefensible from an empirical standpoint. For the human capital model, we followed
the strategy of calibrating parameters from a priori evidence in our model, and get only
the single, stagnant steady state. Therefore, across the models, we conclude that while
obtaining multiple equilibria is possible, it cannot be done in a very robust manner. The
single-equilibrium political economy models of BV and AR are faced with diﬀerent robustness
considerations. The BV model requires a larger degree of human capital externalities than
reported by empirical studies, while we have to resort to debatable proxies such as public
administration expenditures for political rents while calibrating the AR model.
Regarding policies to overcome stagnation, the Big Push models suggest investment
subsidies and tax credits, the occupational choice model suggests redistribution of initial
wealth, and the human capital model suggests education subsidies. The ﬁr s tt w oa r eo n e -
shot interventions, while the third is a permanent policy. Given the above discussion on
robustness of multiple equilibria, one needs to be cautious about concluding that temporary
policies will suﬃce to revive stagnant economies. While the BV model is not one of multiple
equilibria with automatic implications for a one-shot policy change, foreign aid for educating
the poor is only needed for one generation.
Quantitatively, the policy interventions suggested by the models are not large: 4 to 7%
investment subsidy rate and even lower income tax rate to give the economy a Big Push,
4% of initial wealth redistribution to get a better mix of occupations, around 3% tax rate to
subsidize human capital accumulation, and an expenditure of about 1% to 5.6% of lifetime
income of the rich in the BV model (provided enough foreign aid is forthcoming for a few
years). The AR model provides some insight into why such seemingly low-cost policies are
not implemented widely; several political variables such as political rents and democratic
power have to be altered ﬁrst, or in conjunction with other policy changes, and it is not easy
to see how this can be accomplished.
Even though the models focus on diﬀerent channels, considering them together allows
us to gain a more comprehensive picture of policy reform. For instance, our human capital
policy experiments suggest that foreign aid is not required to revive the fortunes of sSA;
by taxing the poor, as opposed to just the rich, which is the only possibility considered in
the BV framework, the economy could free itself from stagnation on its own. However, the
BV model suggests that temporary foreign aid can act as a seed in encouraging the local
wealthy minority to share the costs of educating the poor. Both frameworks favorably view
the policy of foreign lending for education purposes, provided problems of enforcement can
40be resolved.
We can also identify recurring explanatory factors that would be leading candidates for
inclusion in a more comprehensive model. Decreasing inequality would help avoid stagnation
in both the occupational choice and the BV setups, and if broadly interpreted, in the human
capital framework. Likewise human capital subsidies help in both the BV and AR models,
and form the central policy recommendation of the human capital model. Since we associate
ﬁxed costs of technology adoption with skilled labor in the calibration of the MSV models,
increases in human capital would decrease costs and play a positive role in their setup as
well. Finally, capital market imperfections are an important feature of the occupational
choice and human capital explanations.
Indeed, Mauritius, the success story of this region has followed several of the suggested
policies, such as investment tax credits and human capital subsidies, simultaneously; it also
scores highly on surveys of civil rights and political liberties. Since the reasons for stagnation
are likely to be multiple, and the cost of each policy not inordinate, following multiple policies
instead of a particular one appears to be a prudent approach to follow.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Our paper makes both a methodological and a substantive contribution. We use the method-
ology of calibration to study models of stagnation, each of which captures a diﬀerent expla-
nation. We think calibration is an ideal choice for evaluating models of stagnation, given the
problems of data availability and nonlinearity, and the ease with which it allows the study
of counterfactual policy experiments. On the substantive front, we provide quantitative es-
timates of policy interventions that can overcome economic stagnation. In terms of tax or
subsidy rates, or costs as a fraction of GDP, these are not high. However, we see both the
need to be cautious about advocating one-shot or temporary policies, and the advantages of
following a multipronged approach.
We ﬁnd that even stylized models can be calibrated with considerable success. And one
can ﬁnd empirical counterparts for the policies they recommend. Given these outcomes, it
would be fruitful to extend some of these models with the aim of larger scale computation
and calibration. With the burden of analytical tractability reduced, several of the suggested
channels of stagnation, including politico-economic factors, could be studied in an integrated
fashion in one model, and the costs of the diﬀerent policy instruments and welfare gains can
be compared in a more meaningful way. Finally, it would be useful to collect and assemble
more extensive data for use in the quantitative evaluation of models of political economy
and stagnation, and focus theoretical attention on how politico-economic reforms could be
carried out.
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